Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism

Eriksson, John; Tiozzo, Marco

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0561-7

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The twenty papers from the 2011-2020 decade are: Baker, Robson (2015), Capraru (2016), Carter (2014), Clapp (2015), Cohnitz, Marques (2014), Colomina-Almiñana (2015), Díaz (2016), Egan (2014), Eriksson, Tiozzo (2016), Hales (2014), Hîncu (2015), Huvenes (2014), Kompa (2015), Lasersohn (2011), López de Sa (2015), Miščević (2018), Moltmann (2012), Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2013), Palmira (2014), andStojanovic (2012).…”

Section: (D)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Francén 2010: 31) Consequently, even if this account yields a sense in which the parties' judgments are faultless, it is far from obvious whether it [Prichard's epistemic relativism] accounts for our intuitions [of faultlessness] better than other accounts. (Eriksson, Tiozzo 2016: 1529 Kölbel complains that the assumption of objective normative facts about taste fails to explain the intuition that the deliciousness of a beer is less objective than how many are left in the refrigerator. However, relativism about taste fails to explain why we routinely acknowledge that there are bona fide experts about beer, wine, whiskey, etc.…”

Section: Collocation Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

Bordonaba-Plou

2021

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According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, The Argument from Philosophical Practice claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, The Argument from Intuition Talk contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreementsa topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.

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Section: (D)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Collocation Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

Bordonaba-Plou

2021

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“…8 Stojanovic (2017a) gives a nice overview of the state of the debate. 9 See Eriksson and Tiozzo (2016), Palmira (2015), and MacFarlane (2014), Chapter 6 for discussion of different, more theory-laden, ways of characterizing the behavior. Though I am indebted to MacFarlane's work in this area, I disregard his advice to stop using the label "faultless disagreement" altogether.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement

Rudolph

2018

Philos Stud

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Faultless disagreement and faultless retraction have been taken to motivate relativism for predicates of personal taste, like 'tasty'. Less attention has been devoted to the question of what aspect of their meaning underlies this relativist behavior. This paper illustrates these same phenomena with a new category of expressions: appearance predicates, like 'tastes vegan' and 'looks blue'. Appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste both fall into the broader category of experiential predicates. Approaching predicates of personal taste from this angle suggests that their relativist behavior is due to their experience-sensitivity, rather than their evaluative meaning. Furthermore, appearance predicates hold interest beyond what they can teach us about predicates of personal taste. Examination of a variety of uses of appearance predicates reveals that they give rise to relativist behavior for a variety of reasons -including some that apply also to other types of expressions, such as epistemic modals and comparative terms. This paper thus serves both to probe the source of relativist behavior in discourse about personal taste, as well as to map out this kind of behavior in the rich and under-explored discourse about appearances.

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“…Wyatt motivates the need for a novel absolutist position by noting that extant versions such as Schafer's (2011) (and Hills' [2013], even though he does not discuss her view in the paper) suffer from a series of inadequacies. By rehearsing familiar objections provided by Baker and Robson (2017) and Eriksson and Tiozzo (2016), as well as by bringing in new ones, Wyatt shows that such positions overgeneralize (counting disagreement in objective matters as faultless), provide an implausible account of disagreement resolution, or give wrong verdicts in cases involving ignorant tasters. In addition, Wyatt criticizes Schafer for not respecting the findings of experimental work on predicates of personal taste and similarly perspectival expressions (e.g., those in Cova and Pain [2012]), which, when methodologically combined with the hypothesis advanced by Wyatt that the contents of subjects' beliefs and what they assert are perspective-specific, dialectically serve to motivate his new version of absolutism).…”

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confidence: 99%

On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste

Hîncu

Zeman

2021

Theoria

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In this critical paper, we engage with a recent absolutist proposal to account for faultless disagreementthat of Jeremy Wyatt. We first introduce the phenomenon to be explained and briefly present Wyatt's account. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to spelling out objections to various aspects of the view, which are related to his adherence to semantic minimalism, the interpretation of the empirical data he relies on, and his construal of both faultlessness and disagreement. We end with a comparison of the proposal with other views on the market from the point of view of theoretical economy.

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Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism

Cited by 12 publications

References 27 publications

An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement

On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste

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