Mavericks or Loyalists? Popular Ballot Jumpers and Party Discipline in the Flexible-List PR Context

Abstract

Preference voting threatens the power of party leaders in PR contexts to enforce party unity and pursue policy by encouraging candidates to groom personal reputations. This study posits that party leadership might be able to enforce party discipline through other means at their disposal even as their control over candidates’ election ranks weakens. These include access to the party label and distribution of senior legislative- and party positions. Using original data from the Czech flexible-list PR context covering the period between 1996 and 2021, this study shows that the MPs who are elected thanks to preference voting are no more likely than their colleagues to individualize their legislative behavior or cast a dissenting roll-call vote. What is more, these popular MPs face a more restricted access to reelection and senior positions that come with agenda-setting power and exposure. This evidence suggests that political parties take active steps to limit the autonomy of the MPs who owe their positions to voters.

Apprentices or outsiders? Age-driven heterogeneities in access to political capital and reelection

“…The fact that most voters vote for parties rather than individual candidates allows political parties considerable flexibility in composing their candidate lists. Consequently, parties have the relative freedom to promote loyal party members and sideline or exclude dissenting individuals (Outlý and Prouza, 2013; Smrek, 2023) and affect the representation of different social groups, including young people (Hájek, 2019: 556) and women (Stegmaier et al, 2014), among others.…”

The impact of closed and flexible candidate lists on the representation of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic

“…Parties also try to use the familiarity, local political experience or birthplace of specific candidates who can attract fickle voters (Crisp et al 2013;Shugart et al 2005), which can cause a greater individualism towards the party in Parliament (Cantor -Herrnson 1997;Sieberer 2010;Tavits 2009Tavits , 2010Kam 2009;Heidar 2006). In the Czech Republic, the preferentially elected MPs support the party line (Smrek 2023), and parties demand responsibility towards the party from their MPs under the threat of not including the MPs in elective positions (Däu-bler et al 2018). The parties have also used the ministers to maximise electoral gains in a specific constituency (Dvořák -Pink 2022).…”

“…Research in the Czech Republic focuses on the use and impact of preferential votes at all levels, whether municipal (Kopřiva 2012;Lebeda 2009;Šedo 2009), regional (Voda 2012), or in elections to the Chamber of Deputies (André et al 2017;Haase -Formánková et al 2022;Balík -Hruška 2022;Kneblová, 2010Kneblová, , 2014Kudrna 2010;Kyloušek 2006;Morkes 2007;Smrek 2023;Spáč 2011;Vartazaryan and Škultéty 2022;Voda 2010Voda , 2013Voda -Pink 2009). Changes in the electoral system 3 in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies are summarised in Table 1.…”