Mean irradiance profile of a Gaussian beam under random jitter

Jiang, Dagang; Yuan, Yongchao; Yang, Lin; Lyu, Ting; Zhu, Bin; Yao, Yi Yong

doi:10.1364/oe.26.027472

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…To know the received power, it is necessary to determine the radius of the Gaussian beam on reaching the receiver, which has been calculated according to the procedure described in, 31,32 taking into account the pointing error intrinsic to any real satellite system. With the results, an exhaustive study has been made of the characteristic parameters that characterise the system, such as the wavelength, the pointing error and the aperture diameters of both Alice and Bob.…”

Section: Transmission Lossesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inflight demonstrator of quantum key distribution between CubeSats of Q-ANSER program

Jimenez-Girela,

Arteaga-Diaz,

Merino Pérez

et al. 2023

Photonics for Quantum 2023

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In Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), the emitter and receiver need to share an optical quantum channel - which can be optical fibre, terrestrial free-space or space-based links- to exchange the quantum states. However, with the future aim to achieve a quantum global communication network, communications links between small satellites in constellations will be required. In this context, the experience of INTA in the ANSER (Advanced Nanosatellite Systems for Earth Observation Research) small satellite constellation program will be exploited. This program develops a set of missions that will include groupings of a minimum of three CubeSats (a leader and two or more followers) flying in formation and in coordinated operation for a common mission. Therefore, the only difference between ANSER and Q-ANSER program will be the payload of the satellite. In Q-ANSER, in which a prepare-and-measure B92 QKD protocol will be used to generate the secret key, two optical systems will be introduced. In the emitter this system will be capable of sending polarized weak coherent laser pulses, attenuated to single-photon level, to the receiver, which will also be an optical system capable of receiving and detecting these single photons. Prepare-and-measure QKD schemes with polarization encoding require the minimization of polarization degradation both in the transmitter and receiver designs. In particular, the polarization extinction ratio (PER) should be maintained as high as possible to reduce the quantum bit error rate (QBER) . This polarization control will be done with the polarization modulators based on liquid crystals developed by INTA.

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Section: Transmission Lossesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inflight demonstrator of quantum key distribution between CubeSats of Q-ANSER program

Jimenez-Girela,

Arteaga-Diaz,

Merino Pérez

et al. 2023

Photonics for Quantum 2023

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“…Additionally, we must consider that in this case the attacker must use a larger aperture for the optical system to distinguish the states, since the long-term beam irradiance distribution at the aperture is broadened by atmospheric turbulence and pointing errors. We can model the long-term irradiance profile of a gaussian beam that has been propagated through atmospheric turbulence according to [52]. Assuming small pointing errors, we can approximate the results to those of [53].…”

Section: B Realistic Channel and Pointing Error Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures

2022

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Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum states, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a sidechannel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange.

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“…In [6], the authors take the effects of atmospheric transmissions and the far-field spot area of the laser system into consideration, simulating the effectiveness of a 10,000-watt high-energy laser system by calculating the atmospheric transmittance [7,8], the quality of the laser beam after being affected by atmospheric turbulence [9][10][11][12][13][14][15], the spot area of the target in the far field, the power density of the target in the far field [16][17][18][19][20], and the cumulative energy density [21,22], which gives the optimal intercept radius and the damage probability of the 10,000-watt highenergy laser system in different atmospheric environments. In [23], the authors proposed a systematic averaging method from the physical mechanism of the formation of the long-period averaged power intensity distribution, modelling the long-period averaged power intensity distribution under the effect of tracking and aiming errors and beam drift. According to the different characteristics of the capture link and the tracking link, they deduced the closed expression of the long-period averaged power intensity distribution under tracking and aiming errors [24][25][26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors do not combine specific target characteristics to analyse the damage probability in detail in [29,30]; although the authors combine target characteristics, the model granularity is large and the results are not accurate enough in [5,6]. In [23], the authors determine the average spot intensity distribution under the effect of turbulence and tracking and aiming errors, but they do not provide the form of the probability distribution of spot intensity, which is not conducive to the subsequent modelling of the damage probability. In other references, the authors analysed the atmospheric transmission effect of lasers, as well as the description of the tracking and aiming errors and laser-target interactions, but did not systematically discuss the damage probability for a specific target.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation Analysis of Dynamic Damage Probability Modelling for Laser Systems

Shi,

Sun,

Xie

et al. 2023

Mathematics

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The paper proposes a method that analyses the dynamic damage probability of laser systems to address the shortcomings of the quantitative model for the damage probability of laser systems. Firstly, the far-field energy density distribution model is constructed according to the power spectrum inversion method. Then, the instantaneous on-target spot power density distribution is equivalently portrayed based on the combination of the far-field power density and the missile target characteristics. Next, the instantaneous on-target spot is combined with the tracking and aiming error to obtain the probability distribution of the energy density of the long-period on-target spot. Finally, the temperature probability distribution is obtained by analyzing the relation between the target energy density and the temperature of the inner wall of the warhead. Consequently, the damage probability was calculated. The simulation shows that there is a unique maximum damage probability when the target is flying in a straight line and the laser system strikes the missile sideways. The method can provide support for the shooting timing of high-energy laser systems.

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Mean irradiance profile of a Gaussian beam under random jitter

Cited by 11 publications

References 20 publications

Inflight demonstrator of quantum key distribution between CubeSats of Q-ANSER program

Inflight demonstrator of quantum key distribution between CubeSats of Q-ANSER program

Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures

Simulation Analysis of Dynamic Damage Probability Modelling for Laser Systems

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