Measurement device-independent quantum dialogue

Abstract

Very recently, the experimental demonstration of Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) with state-of-the-art atomic quantum memory has been reported (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2017). Quantum Dialogue (QD) falls under QSDC where the secrete messages are communicated simultaneously between two legitimate parties. The successful experimental demonstration of QSDC opens up the possibilities for practical implementation of QD protocols. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the practical security issues of QD protocols for future implementation. Since the very first proposal for QD by Nguyen (Phys. Lett. A, 2004) a large number of variants and extensions have been presented till date. However, all of those leak half of the secret bits to the adversary through classical communications of the measurement results. In this direction, motivated by the idea of Lo et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012), we propose a Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) scheme which is resistant to such information leakage as well as side channel attacks. In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob, two legitimate parties, are allowed to prepare the states only. The states are measured by an untrusted third party (UTP) who may himself behave as an adversary. We show that our protocol is secure under this adversarial model. The current protocol does not require any quantum memory and thus it is inherently robust against memory attacks. Such robustness might not be guaranteed in the QSDC protocol with quantum memory (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2017).

Secure Multi-Party Quantum Conference and Xor Computation

“…We now show that the above MDI-QD protocol [34] is not secure against intercept-and-resend attack and an adversary can get hold of some amount of information about the messages. So we propose a modified version of this protocol, which is secure against this attack.…”

“…In this paper, we make four distinct contributions. First, we revisit the two-party MDI-QD protocol [34], and show that this is not secure against intercept-and-resend attack. Then we modify the two-party MDI-QD protocol to make it secure against this attack.…”

“…The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we revisit the MDI-QD protocol proposed in [34]. Then in the next section, we discuss intercept-and-resend attack on the MDI-QD protocol [34] and we propose its modified version.…”

“…The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we revisit the MDI-QD protocol proposed in [34]. Then in the next section, we discuss intercept-and-resend attack on the MDI-QD protocol [34] and we propose its modified version. Section 4 describes our proposed protocol for a three-party quantum conference and it's correctness and security analysis.…”

“…Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) Protocol of [34] Here, in this section, we shortly describe the MDI-QD protocol proposed in [34], where two legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob, can simultaneously exchange their messages. The proposal in [34] composed two different protocols from [2] and [12]. Alice and Bob first perform some QKD, namely, BB84 [2] and generate a shared key k between themselves.…”