1991
DOI: 10.2172/5847431
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Measurement of intensity-dependent rates of above-threshold ionization (ATI) of atomic hydrogen at 248 nm

Abstract: saved me countless hours in the lab and taught me many valuable si Us such as how to keep an ultrahigh vacuum system clean and how to choose a capacitor for a short-pulse circuit. In this dissertation, I have tried to distinguish between things I can claim credit for individually ("I measured ...") and group efforts ("We measured ..."). I depended on Group CLS-5, especially Dr. Toni Taylor, Sue Harper, and Jeff Roberts, to maintain and operate the LABS-I laser. They also provided the measurement of the pulse l… Show more

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“…75 Perhaps of greater conceptual significance is that the right to silence encapsulated the rule against self-incrimination, and potentially even dates back to the hearsay trial of John Lilburn, the Leveller, in 1637. 76 In a more recent context, Templeman LJ stated: 'the privilege can only be justified on two grounds, first that it discourages the ill-treatment of a suspect and secondly that it discourages the production of dubious confessions' 77 Furthermore, Dennis suggests that, 'in its primary form the privilege against self-incrimination defines the scope of legal duties to co-operate in certain legal procedures' 78 and, therefore, 'the privilege against self-incrimination is of course the principle that there is no legal obligation to answer questions from the police or to testify at trial.' 79 Further adding to the debate, Goddard LJ observed:…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…75 Perhaps of greater conceptual significance is that the right to silence encapsulated the rule against self-incrimination, and potentially even dates back to the hearsay trial of John Lilburn, the Leveller, in 1637. 76 In a more recent context, Templeman LJ stated: 'the privilege can only be justified on two grounds, first that it discourages the ill-treatment of a suspect and secondly that it discourages the production of dubious confessions' 77 Furthermore, Dennis suggests that, 'in its primary form the privilege against self-incrimination defines the scope of legal duties to co-operate in certain legal procedures' 78 and, therefore, 'the privilege against self-incrimination is of course the principle that there is no legal obligation to answer questions from the police or to testify at trial.' 79 Further adding to the debate, Goddard LJ observed:…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%