“…75 Perhaps of greater conceptual significance is that the right to silence encapsulated the rule against self-incrimination, and potentially even dates back to the hearsay trial of John Lilburn, the Leveller, in 1637. 76 In a more recent context, Templeman LJ stated: 'the privilege can only be justified on two grounds, first that it discourages the ill-treatment of a suspect and secondly that it discourages the production of dubious confessions' 77 Furthermore, Dennis suggests that, 'in its primary form the privilege against self-incrimination defines the scope of legal duties to co-operate in certain legal procedures' 78 and, therefore, 'the privilege against self-incrimination is of course the principle that there is no legal obligation to answer questions from the police or to testify at trial.' 79 Further adding to the debate, Goddard LJ observed:…”