Measuring corruption: whose perceptions should we rely on? Evidence from Iceland"

Abstract

The extent of corruption in Iceland is highly contested. International corruption measures indicate a relatively small amount of corruption while domestic public opinion suggest a serious corruption problem. Thus, uncertainty prevails about the actual extent of corruption and whose perceptions to rely on. This problem is relevant for corruption research in general. Perceptions are increasingly used as proxies for the actual levels of corruption in comparative research. But we still do not know enough about the accuracy of these proxies or the criteria they must meet in order to give dependable results. In fact, radical differences exist concerning evaluations of perceptions between those who believe in unbiased learning and those believing perceptual bias to be widespread. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to attempt to gauge which factors may influence how perceptions of corruption are shaped and why differences in corruption perceptions between different groups may be so pronounced. We present findings from original survey data from three parallel surveys – among the "public", experts, and "municipal practitioners" – conducted in Iceland in 2014. Expectations based on the perceptual bias approach are tested, indicating that perceptions may be affected by (1) information factors, (2) direct experience of corruption and (3) emotive factors. The validity of perception measures should be considered with this in mind. Domestic experts are likely to be well informed and avoid perceptual bias to a greater extent than other groups. Our examination of the Icelandic case suggests that the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) tends to underestimate corruption problems in "mature welfare states", such as Iceland, whilst the general public tends to overestimate it.

Opportunity beliefs and class differences in subjective status injustice during the Great Recession in Iceland

“…Scholars and lay people alike have long raised concerns over corruption in Iceland, implying that it plays a role in shaping opportunities for upward mobility and privileges in this small and tightly-knit society (Capacent-Gallup, 2009; Erlingsson and Kristinsson, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2012). In the turmoil of the crisis, social critics and protest leaders amplified this sentiment, mobilizing about a quarter of the population in the so-called ‘Pots and Pans Revolution’ that toppled the government in January 2009 (Bernburg, 2016).…”

Corruption risks in a mature democracy : Mechanisms of social advantage and danger zones for corruption

“…For instance, Atkinson (2011) has argued that citizens' high estimations of the extent of corruption in Canada (and other mature democracies) can be explained by a general breakdown of trust and suspicions about self-serving conduct, rather than actual corruption as defined, for instance, by Transparency International, the World Bank and most academics. Such a hypothesis is supported by the finding that the public's views on the extent of corruption are often closely linked to levels of trust in politicians more generally (Erlingsson and Kristinsson 2016;Van de Walle 2008). This suggests that perceptions of corruption may be influenced by factors beyond objective definitions of corruption.…”

“…First, in mature democracies, discrepancies have been observed between how experts evaluate corruption problems and how citizens perceive them (e.g., Erlingsson and Kristinsson 2016). One potential explanation for this discrepancy is that expert evaluations are focused on cruder forms of corruption, such as public officials regularly demanding bribes, whereas the forms corruption that occur in mature democracies are typically more subtle in character, such as 'old boys' networks' and nepotism via friend-and kinship ties (Andersson 2017;Bauhr 2012).…”