Measuring institutional quality in ancient Athens

Bergh, Andreas; Lyttkens, Carl Hampus

doi:10.1017/s174413741300043x

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Bergh and Lyttkens (2014) examine the quality of the economic institutions of Athens in the 340s (a period sufficiently covered in the sources) by applying the Economic Freedom Index 8 . Athens scores an impressive 8.8 out of 10 in the 2013 international league, second to Hong Kong with a score of 9.02 (while modern Greece, with a score of 6.87, was in the 68 th position).…”

Section: Institutions and Culture As Causes Of The Ancient Greek Efflmentioning

confidence: 99%

The failure of ancient Greek growth: institutions, culture and energy cost

Tridimas

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Along with introducing democracy, advancing philosophy and excelling at the arts, during the period 800–300bceancient Greece achieved substantial economic prosperity. Recent literature attributes the efflorescence to the institutions and culture of democratic city-states. However, the city-states failed to initiate sustained growth. Technological progress remained slow and the economic efflorescence ended after the prevalence of Macedon and the subsequent Roman conquest. The present study scrutinises the roles of city-state institutions and culture. It shows that ultimately ancient Greece could not sustain long-run growth because a multitude of independent small city-states prevented the exploitation of economies of scale and stoked continual wars that exhausted them financially and militarily, and because of a culture valuing landholding, self-sufficiency and collectivist attitudes.

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Section: Institutions and Culture As Causes Of The Ancient Greek Efflmentioning

confidence: 99%

The failure of ancient Greek growth: institutions, culture and energy cost

Tridimas

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

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“… 19 There is a vast recent bibliography which revisits significantly the older, basic Finley's (1973) model (which, indeed, had a great influence in previous decades) about the backwardness of the ancient Greek economy, including banking. For these recent views which argue that, in some aspects the ancient Greek economy had many ‘modern’ characteristics, see among others (Amemiya, 2007; Bergh and Lyttkens, 2014; Bitros and Karayannis, 2008; Economou et al ., 2015; Engen, 2010; Halkos and Kyriazis, 2009; Kyriazis, 2009; Lyttkens, 2013; Mackil, 2013; Ober, 2008, 2011, 2015; Saller, 2002). …”

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confidence: 99%

The emergence and the evolution of property rights in ancient Greece

Economou

Kyriazis

2016

Journal of Institutional Economics

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In this paper, we trace the emergence and the evolution of property rights from the Homeric Era (1100–750 BCE) to Classical Greece, based on ancient sources and modern interpretations. Indications of the emergence of property rights are to be found in the writings of eighth century Homer and Hesiod. Property rights evolved, together with changes in warfare and city-states during the Archaic and Classical periods, becoming more secure and specific, based on contracts. We analyse as case studies Themistocles’ Naval Law of 483/2 BCE and Nicophon's Monetary Law of 376/5. We also cover some other aspects of property rights, such as commercial transactions and the enforcement of contracts, official (written) law and legally binding procedures of law enforcement, banking services and the rights of women.

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“…Furthermore, our study provides a snapshot of institutions over a limited time period and therefore does not elucidate the changes occurring in the institutional structure. The history of institutional evolution has been far from unidirectional, and institutional reversals are common throughout history (Schein 2012;Bergh and Lyttkens 2014). A historical study of the evolution of institutional diversity would therefore be another important avenue for future research.…”

Section: Conclusion/discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Diversity of Entrepreneurial Regimes in Europe

Dilli

Elert²

2016

SSRN Journal

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Although institutional reforms are necessary to increase rates of entrepreneurship in European countries, we argue that one-size-fits-all reform strategies are unlikely to be successful. Reform strategies must be informed by a better knowledge of the varieties of European capitalism and the institutional complementarities that drive these differences. We investigate these issues by gathering a number of potentially relevant entrepreneurial regime measurements as well as indicators of formal and informal institutions based on data available from the 2000s onward. We employ principal component analysis, factor analysis and cluster analysis to examine how 21 European countries and the United States cluster in the entrepreneurial and institutional dimensions. Our results reveal six country clusters, or entrepreneurial regimes, with a distinct bundle of entrepreneurial characteristics and institutional attributes. The main implication is that different reform strategies are appropriate to promote entrepreneurship and economic growth in European countries in different clusters.

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Measuring institutional quality in ancient Athens

Cited by 15 publications

References 54 publications

The failure of ancient Greek growth: institutions, culture and energy cost

The failure of ancient Greek growth: institutions, culture and energy cost

The emergence and the evolution of property rights in ancient Greece

The Diversity of Entrepreneurial Regimes in Europe

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