Measuring Institutions in russian regions: Methodology, Sources of data, Analysis

Baranov, Alexey; Malkov, Egor; Polishchuk, Leonid; Рохлиц, М.; Сюняев, Г. Р.

doi:10.32609/0042-8736-2015-2-69-103

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…As a result, Russia features a mosaic of institutional regimes of highly uneven quality (Baranov et al, 2015), and these institutions can be considered as largely endogenous. 12 Rotation of governors was also uneven -in some regions, they managed to keep office for a decade and longer, while in others they were replaced every two to three years.…”

Section: Russian Governors and Regional Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Measurement of Russian regional institutions is still work in progress (Baranov et al, 2015); we selected one of the most popular measures -the RA Expert regional investment climate rating, 14 which reflects investment potential, quality of governance and political, legal and other investment risks. This index aggregates official statistical data with expert assessments, and is in agreement with a number of other commonly used indicators of Russian regional institutions.…”

Section: Russian Governors and Regional Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its organisation and its instruments. It is particularly concerned with how the changing conditions of contemporary governing affect perennial questions in political science and public administration. Executive Politics and Governance is therefore centrally interested in questions such as how politics interacts with bureaucracies, how issues rise and fall on political agendas, and how public organisations and services are designed and operated. This book series encourages a closer engagement with the role of politics in shaping executive structures, and how administration shapes politics and policy-making. In addition, this series also wishes to engage with the scholarship that focuses on the organisational aspects of politics, such as government formation and legislative institutions.The series welcomes high-quality research-led monographs with comparative appeal. Edited volumes that provide in-depth analysis and critical insights into the field of Executive Politics and Governance are also encouraged.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataElites, institutions and the quality of government / edited by Carl Dahlström, Associate Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden ; Lena Wängnerud, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. pages cm. -(Executive politics and governance) Includes bibliographical references. Summary: "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corru...

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Section: Russian Governors and Regional Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Russian Governors and Regional Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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“…Поскольку институты принципиально «многомерны», то проведение сравнительного анализа для разных стран оказывается зачастую проблематичным. Кроме того, как правило, качество институтов определяется на основе обобщенных экспертных оценок, которые не в равной мере применимы к рассматриваемым в различных исследованиях странам [1].…”

Section: пэ № 3 2016unclassified

Institutions and Geography in Economic Development: A Heterodox Economic Discussion

Кирдина¹

2016

Spatial Economics

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Дискуссии о сравнительной роли географических и социальных (институциональных) факторов в экономическом развитии насчитывают не одну сотню лет. Фундаментальным основанием этих дискуссий является рассмотрение материального мира с позиций вза-имосвязи природы и общества. Активно формирующаяся гетеродоксальная экономика, которая декларирует необходимость преодолеть ограничения базовых предпосылок эко-номического мейнстрима, вносит в эту перманентную дискуссию свой вклад. В статье проанализирована «географическая гипотеза» в работах современных российских и за-рубежных институционалистов, а также показаны ее истоки. Выявлено, что при анализе долгосрочных периодов экономической эволюции география очевидно имеет значение. В подтверждение приводятся результаты эмпирических исследований, проведенных в Рос-сии и мире с начала 2000-х гг. и по настоящее время. ВВЕДЕНИЕСтановление таких направлений экономического анализа, как институци-ональная экономика, эволюционная экономика, экономика сложности, соци-альная экономика и ряда других, относимых к гетеродоксальной экономике (heterodox economics), связано с излишней жесткостью -несмотря на попыт-ки ее ослабить -основных предпосылок ортодоксальной неоклассической экономики. Эта жесткость делает предпосылки экономикс нереалистичными по отношению к реально протекающим экономическим процессам. В совре-менных условиях с позиций неоклассического мейнстрима зачастую трудно © Кирдина С.Г., 2016 Представлены результаты исследования в рамках проекта РГНФ № 14-02-00422 «Макро-институциональная циклическая динамика: теория и моделирование».

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“…We also make use of profound variation across the Russian Federation of our second variable of interestthe quality of institutions, including the protection of property rights 12 (see e.g. Baranov et al, 2015). Interregional institutional diversity goes back to the 1990s, when the central government ceded to regions key economic policy and institutional reform prerogatives, and such devolution had resulted in a patchwork of distinct institutional regimes.…”

Section: Empirical Strategy and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Costs and Benefits of Land Ownership: The Case of Russian Firms

et al. 2015

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Private ownership confers numerous benefits, including stronger performance incentives, better use of privately owned assets, and improved access to finance. We argue that privately owned land could be both an asset and a liability, and overall net benefits of land ownership are contingent on the quality of surrounding institutions. We present a simple model and empirical evidence based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) in Russia, which clearly demonstrates such conditionality in the case of land ownership by Russian industrial firms. Consistently with earlier literature, land ownership facilitates firms' access to finance (the "de Soto effect"), but at the same time entails additional risks and obstacles to doing business. When the quality of property rights protection and other key institutions is poor, land ownership could have an adverse effect on firms' performance.

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Measuring Institutions in russian regions: Methodology, Sources of data, Analysis

Cited by 16 publications

References 36 publications

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Institutions and Geography in Economic Development: A Heterodox Economic Discussion

Costs and Benefits of Land Ownership: The Case of Russian Firms

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