Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU

Dür, Andreas

doi:10.1177/1465116508095151

Cited by 239 publications

(189 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…al. 2014;Dür 2008;Dür & Matteo, 2012;Klüver 2012;Yackee & Yackee 2006). The research has focused on different related topics, such as the processes of group mobilization, the organizational characteristics of the IGs, the strategies they deploy to promote their interest vis-a-vis diverse institutions to influence policy decisions, and the determinants of that participation and influence (Baumgartner & Leech 1998).…”

Section: Analytical Framementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A Dür notes, this is due to different reasons, like the fact that it is exerted through many different channels, the existence of the phenomena of counteractive lobbying, and that influence is wielded at different stages of the DMP (Dür 2008 561: see also Helboe 2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Three main strategies have been designed (Dür 2008 Jacobs and Page (2005), which relies on surveys to figure out which IGs exert more influence on US Foreign Policy. The third method is preference attainment, in which "the outcomes of political processes are compared with the ideal points of actors" (Dür 2008: 566).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Congressional Lobby, Foreign Policy, and Trade Agreements in Democratic Chile

Gamboa

Segovia

2017

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies the participation and influence of IGs on Chilean Foreign Policy between 1990 and 2014, in light of the main results provided by academic literature on this topic. To do this, we created an original database of 590 international treaties that Chile subscribed in the period, and analyzed it using quantitative techniques. The paper argues, first, that the participation of IGs in the matter is rather low, and that the participation pattern is highly unbalanced. Second, our preference attainment analysis underlies that the agreement between the preferences of business IGs and the content of treaties is no greater than that of other type of IGs.Research for this paper was funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs under the SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project, based at the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern, Switzerland. SECO working papers are preliminary documents posted on the WTI website ( www.wti.org) and widely circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. These papers have not been formally edited. Citations should refer to a "SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project" paper with appropriate reference made to the author(s). international treaties that Chile subscribed in the period, and analyzed it using quantitative techniques. The paper argues, first, that the participation of IGs in the matter is rather low, and that the participation pattern is highly unbalanced. Second, our preference attainment analysis underlies that the agreement between the preferences of business IGs and the content of treaties is no greater than that of other type of IGs.

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Section: Analytical Framementioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Congressional Lobby, Foreign Policy, and Trade Agreements in Democratic Chile

Gamboa

Segovia

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…The second approach to measure bargaining success thus used salience weights to readjust the original success measures in order to account for how important each issue has been to each country (see Dür, 2008;Golub, 2010). The salience weights were manually coded from the negotiation protocols reported in the Earth Negotiations Bulletins (IISD, 2007(IISD, -2009) (see Appendix 1).…”

Section: Operationalization Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations

Weiler¹

2012

Climate Policy

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“…A political codification of Court decisions thus increases legal certainty. Second, analyzing the dynamics between judicial and legislative politics is of great 4 The study of interest organizations' influence on policy outputs has developed a preference attainment approach to examine and measure lobbying influence (Dür, 2008;Klüver, 2011). This paper draws on the basic idea of the preference attainment approach but examines the attainment of rules and principles as generated by the Court instead of preferences.…”

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confidence: 99%

Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs? The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union

Martinsen

2015

Comparative Political Studies

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The ability of courts to generate political change has long been debated in national, comparative and international politics. In the examination of the interaction between judicial and legislative politics, scholars have disagreed on the degree of judicial power and the ability of politics to override unwanted jurisprudence. In this debate, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has become famous for its central and occasionally controversial role in European integration. This paper examines to what extent and under which conditions judicial decisions influence European Union (EU) social policy outputs. A taxonomy of judicial influence is constructed, and expectations of institutional and political conditions on judicial influence are presented. The analysis draws on an extensive novel dataset and examines judicial influence on EU social policies over time, i.e., between 1958 and 2014, as well as for case studies of working time regulations and patients' rights. The findings demonstrate that both the codification and overriding of judicial decisions are unlikely in the contemporary EU-28 of fragmented politics. However, modification and non-adoption constitute other political responses to attenuate unwelcome jurisprudence and constrain the legislative effect of judicial decisions.The ability of courts to generate political change has long been debated in studies of national, comparative and international politics (McCann, 1994;Stone Sweet, 2000;Conant, 2002; 1 For contact, dm@ifs.ku.dk. This project is supported by Danish Research Council project no. 10-079675/FSE.2 Rosenberg, 2008;Carrubba et. al, 2012;Carrubba & Gabel 2015;Pollack 2003;. Are courts powerful generators of political change? Can politics override unwanted judicial decisions? What might condition courts' ability to produce broader change? The interaction between judicial and legislative politics has been examined in studies of American, comparative and European Union (EU) politics, alternating between a 'dynamic' and a 'constrained' court view. A growing body of literature presents a dynamic-court view, according to which a judicialization of politics has occurred in which courts have become increasingly powerful political actors in many contemporary democracies (e.g., Stone Sweet, 2000;Cichowski, 2007;Kelemen, 2013;Alter, 2014). A global trend toward constitutional supremacy has placed constitutional courts in the position of powerful institutions of modern democracies. Parliamentary sovereignty and majoritarian rule are no longer the constitutive principles of democratic politics (Stone Sweet 2000). According to this view, courts are key drivers of change; and in practice, politics is unable to override unwanted jurisprudence.Conversely, the constrained-court view deems the judiciary's broader effect to be limited and conditioned by a large set of factors. Thus, courts cannot be independent movers in establishing change (Conant, 2002;Rosenberg, 2008). Law depends on politics to execute its decisions. Politics can overtur...

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Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU

Cited by 239 publications

References 31 publications

Congressional Lobby, Foreign Policy, and Trade Agreements in Democratic Chile

Congressional Lobby, Foreign Policy, and Trade Agreements in Democratic Chile

Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations

Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs? The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union

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