Measuring State House Speakers' Formal Powers, 1981–2010

Abstract

The cross-sectional variation among state legislative leaders' formal powers provides a unique opportunity to test a variety of hypotheses of the American legislative process that involve the causes and effects of these powers. But to date, measures of these powers have been developed primarily for single years or biennia, limiting their applicability, especially for drawing causal conclusions. In this note, I develop an index of state House speakers' formal powers for each biennia from 1981 to 2010 (for even-year-election states) and from 1982 to 2009 (for odd-year-election states).

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

“…The primary source is hard copies of editions of The State Yellow Book, published during the studied period ( Leadership Directories 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013. The primary source is hard copies of editions of The State Yellow Book, published during the studied period ( Leadership Directories 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013.…”

“…To do so, I use the index of formal Speaker power as developed by Mooney (2013). To do so, I use the index of formal Speaker power as developed by Mooney (2013).…”

“…To assess how groups value committee and party leaders, I collected a new data set on the identity of all committee chairs and legislative leaders in the 99 state legislatures from 1988 to 2012. The primary source is hard copies of editions of The State Yellow Book, published during the studied period ( Leadership Directories 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013. In cases where the relevant information in these volumes was missing or was in other ways incomplete, I supplement it with information collected from archival material, such as legislative minutes and proceedings obtained from state legislative archives.…”

Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence

“…Work on legislatures, executives, courts, and other elite actors suggests that institutions affect outcomes by affecting the distribution of power and resources (Anzia and Jackman 2013;Clucas 2001;Mooney 2012Mooney , 2013Schickler 2001;Wawro and Schickler 2007). Some institutions are theorized to have an indirect influence on outcomes by shaping how debate and negotiations are structured (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Hartog and Monroe 2011;Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Wiseman 2015;Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006), while other institutions are theorized to have a direct influence by empowering some political power brokers to actively pressure other elites (Groseclose 1996;Jenkins and Monroe 2012).…”

“…As a result, they can rely less on leaders' preferences as a signal about what the optimal policy should be (Curry 2015;Krehbiel 1992;Mooney 2012). Second, when leaders can allocate resources that members care about, access to the agenda, financial resources, and committee assignments, members may preemptively incorporate leaders' preference into their own positions as a way to remain in favor with the leaders (Clucas 2001;Herron and Theodos 2004;Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007;Lindst€ adt and Vander Wielen 2014;Mooney 2012Mooney , 2013. As a result, leaders may not have to actually twist arms; legislators may simply act in anticipation of leaders' power (Cameron 2000;Fox and Rothenberg 2011).…”