Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections

Blais, André; Nadeau, Richard; Gidengil, Elisabeth; Nevitte, Neil

doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(00)00017-2

Cited by 159 publications

(117 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Par rapport à la proportion d'électeurs stratégiques, même si la littérature est abondante, notamment en contexte canadien (Blais et al, 2001 ;Merolla et Stephenson, 2007 ;Gidengil et al, 2012), comme aucune analyse ne s'est concentrée sur le Québec, aucun résultat particulier n'est attendu quant à la proportion globale d'électeurs stratégiques. Quant au modèle des détermi-nants du vote stratégique au Québec, les trois hypothèses suivantes sont formulées.…”

Section: Hypothèsesunclassified

Vote stratégique au Québec : analyse de l’élection de 2012

Daoust

2015

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Bien que le vote stratégique soit un thème récurrent lors des campagnes provinciales électorales québécoises, aucune étude n’a analysé le vote stratégique au Québec. En utilisant un sondage du projet Making Electoral Democracy Work, cet article comble cette lacune dans la littérature et analyse l’élection québécoise de 2012 en répondant à deux objectifs principaux : déterminer la proportion de votes stratégiques et identifier les variables individuelles qui influencent la probabilité qu’un électeur opte pour une coordination stratégique. Les résultats indiquent que, dans l’ensemble, 8,4 % des votes peuvent être dits stratégiques. Quant aux déterminants du vote stratégique et tel qu’attendu, le fait pour un électeur d’être partisan et d’avoir un plus grand écart de préférence entre les deux options favorites diminue sa propension à déserter son premier choix. Toutefois, contrairement aux attentes, le niveau de sophistication politique n’influence pas significativement la probabilité qu’un électeur opte pour une coordination stratégique.Despite the fact that strategic voting is a widely used concept in Quebec provincial politics, no research on that topic has been conducted focusing on a Quebec election. To fill this gap in the literature, this article uses a survey of the Making Electoral Democracy Work project designed for the Quebec 2012 election and has two main objectives. Firstly, this research examines the extent to which voters engage in strategic behaviour; secondly, it analyzes the individual factors that influence the proclivity to cast a strategic vote. Results show that overall, 8.4% of the voters can be said to have voted strategically. As expected, for a voter, the fact of being a supporter and having a greater gap in preferences between the two favoured options reduces importantly the probability to cast a strategic vote. However and contrary to expectations, the odds of a strategic coordination are not influenced by voters’ level of political sophistication

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Section: Hypothèsesunclassified

Vote stratégique au Québec : analyse de l’élection de 2012

Daoust

2015

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“…Strategic voting means that citizens vote for a party other than their most preferred one in order to be able to affect the outcome of the elections (Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2001). In the firstorder electoral arena, strategic voting is expected to strengthen the support for larger parties, since they are more likely to govern.…”

Section: Still Second-order?mentioning

confidence: 99%

European Parliament Elections of May 2014: Driven by National Politics or EU Policy Making?

Schmitz

Toygür

2016

PaG

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The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections took place in a very particular environment. Economic crisis, bailout packages, and austerity measures were central on the agenda in many Southern countries while open borders and intra-EU migration gained high salience elsewhere in the Union. A strong decline of political trust in European and national institutions was alarming. At the same time, the nomination and campaigning of "Spitzenkandidaten", lead candidates of EP political groups for European Commission (EC) presidency, was meant to establish a new linkage between European Parliament elections and the (s)election of the president of the Commission. All of this might have changed the very nature of EP elections as second-order national elections. In this paper, we try to shed light on this by analysing aggregate election results, both at the country-level and at the party-level and compare them with the results of the preceding first-order national election in each EU member country. Our results suggest that the ongoing politicisation of EU politics had little impact on the second-order nature of European Parliament elections.

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“…Sincere voters are those individuals who simply cast a ballot for their most preferred party regardless of the consequences of their choice on election outcomes, seat allocation and government formation. Strategic or tactical voters, on the other hand, are those citizens who cast a vote for a less preferred party option, in order to influence the outcome of an election or the government formation (Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2001). In fact, the main goal of these 1 In this section, we review not only specific studies on campaign switching, but also the rich literature on inter-election switching.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Being aware of the relative competitive position of each party, strategic voters acknowledge that their favourite party has little (or no) chance of success. Since they want to avoid wasting their votes, they refrain to vote for that party and decide to cast a ballot for a less preferred party that seems to be the most capable of defeating their least preferred party option (Blais et al, 2001;McGregor, 2012). There are two main types of tactical voting:…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Voters Change Their Mind during an Election Campaign? An Analysis of the Determinants of Campaign Volatility at the 2014 Belgian Federal Elections

Willocq¹

2016

OJPS

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This article examines the causes of stability and change in vote intentions during the 2014 Belgian federal election campaign. Drawing on data from the 2014 Parti Rep Belgian Voter Survey, our study aims to explain why a large number of voters have switched their vote intention in the weeks preceding the federal elections. To this end, we test a series of hypotheses drawn from different theories often referred to in the literature to account for campaign volatility. The results of our analysis reveal that voters can decide to change their vote preferences during the campaign due to strategic considerations related to their perceptions of the coalition potentials of parties. We also find that voters with a low level of political interest are more likely than highly interested voters to switch from one party to another in the weeks preceding the electoral contest. Unsurprisingly, a high degree of affection for the favourite party proves to be a barrier against campaign volatility. The higher the level of affect directed to the most preferred party, the more stable will be the vote intention. Moreover, results show that citizens with a low level of external political efficacy are more prone than others to switch parties in the last weeks of the campaign. By contrast, the ideological profile of the voter has no significant impact on campaign volatility.

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Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections

Cited by 159 publications

References 3 publications

Vote stratégique au Québec : analyse de l’élection de 2012

Vote stratégique au Québec : analyse de l’élection de 2012

European Parliament Elections of May 2014: Driven by National Politics or EU Policy Making?

Why Do Voters Change Their Mind during an Election Campaign? An Analysis of the Determinants of Campaign Volatility at the 2014 Belgian Federal Elections

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