Measuring “Term Limitedness” in U.S. Multi-State Research

Sarbaugh-Thompson, Marjorie

doi:10.1177/153244001001000205

Cited by 26 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The endogenous nature of term‐limit reforms has presented obstacles to revealing the effects of these reforms. By utilizing Sarbaugh‐Thompson's (2010) Term‐Limitedness measure, however, I was able to address this issue with an instrumental variables approach. Statistical tests of the IV tobit approach show that this is an appropriate method from which to study term limits.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance

Lewis

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Do term limits impede the ability of legislators to effectively set fiscal policy? To address this question, I examine state bond ratings from 1996 to 2009. Bond ratings serve as a valuable indicator of a state's fiscal performance, gauging the risk and uncertainty that investors face when buying these bonds. In addition, bond ratings are important policy ends in themselves. High bond ratings make it easier for states to borrow and raise revenue, while lowering interest rates. Results from analyses of "Term-Limitedness" and legislator experience suggest that term limits negatively impact a state's fiscal performance, leading to lower bond ratings.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance

Lewis

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…The two‐stage IV model used to estimate the effect of turnover on the different categories of tax revenues is given by the following equations:

\begin{matrix} {TR}_{it} & = α + γ {TLI}_{it} + ρ {RD}_{it} \\ + \sum_{j = 1}^{10} β_{j} X_{it} + u_{i} + v_{t} + μ_{it} . \end{matrix}

{italicFV}_{italicit} = σ + δ {\overset{TR}{true}}_{italicit} + \sum_{j = 1}^{10} β_{j} X_{italicit} + u_{i} + v_{t} + ϵ_{italicit} .

Instead of using a dummy for term limits in the first stage we use a term limit index ( TLI it ) developed by Yakovlev, Tosun, and Lewis (). Term limits are not homogeneous across states, making proper accounting for their stringency crucial (Sarbaugh‐Thompson ). The TLI, which also passes our exogeneity tests, does a better job than binary measures in describing heterogeneity in term limit stringency and predicting variations in legislative turnover.…”

Section: Empirical Methods and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

State Taxes and Legislative Turnover in the United States

Yakovlev

Leguizamon

2019

Economic Inquiry

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Mounting empirical evidence suggests that term limits and, by extension, higher legislative turnover increase the overall size of government and change its spending composition. However, less is known about the turnover's impact on the composition of tax revenues. This study fills this void by exploiting exogenous variation in term limits and redistricting as instruments for legislative turnover, which is found to be positively associated with most state taxes except for the corporate income tax. We hypothesize that the negative association between legislative turnover and corporate income taxes might be influenced by a higher propensity of business owners to enter term‐limited state legislatures. (JEL H7, H3)

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“…During the 1980s, before term limits were adopted, legislative turnover in Arkansas was low: approximately half of the house seats and two‐thirds of the senate seats were occupied by veteran legislators during this decade (Sarbaugh‐Thompson (), Table ). Given this low turnover before term limits and the stringent limits on length of service that followed, the effects of term limits on the Arkansas Senate might be starker than in most other states, where the institutional change that was induced by more lenient term limit policies did not represent such a drastic change (Sarbaugh‐Thompson (), page 202).…”

Section: Theoretical Expectations: Legislative Behaviour Absent Re‐elmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Behaviour Absent Re-Election Incentives: Findings from a Natural Experiment in the Arkansas Senate

Titiunik

Feher²

2017

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society

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Summary We analyse the effect of removing re‐election incentives on the individual legislative participation of state lawmakers by using an original study based on the random assignment of term length that occurs in the Arkansas Senate, which in turn induces the random assignment of the total number of terms each senator may serve. Across five measures of legislative output—bills introduced, bills passed, bills cosponsored, resolutions and abstention rates, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect. Since our sample is small, we adopt two strategies in our statistical analysis: we perform randomization‐based inference to ensure that our tests adequately control size, and we use tests of equivalence to avoid incorrectly concluding that the effects are null because of low power. We also use bounds as a robustness check to address attrition in our original experimental sample.

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Measuring “Term Limitedness” in U.S. Multi-State Research

Cited by 26 publications

References 13 publications

Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance

Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance

State Taxes and Legislative Turnover in the United States

Legislative Behaviour Absent Re-Election Incentives: Findings from a Natural Experiment in the Arkansas Senate

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