2000
DOI: 10.1111/0022-3816.00018
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Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges

Abstract: The premise of this paper is that while the comparative study of courts can address some vitally important questions in judicial politics, these gains will not be secured without a valid and reliable measure of judge preferences that is comparable within and across courts. Party affiliation of judges is a commonly used but weak substitute that suffers from pronounced equivalence problems. We develop a contextually based, party‐adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure (PAJID) and subject this measure to an ext… Show more

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Cited by 179 publications
(162 citation statements)
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“…The data for this project has primarily been collected from the State Court Data Project (Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000) Within our data, we retained those cases that were complete in their information and in which the justices sat en banc. 19 This left a total of 5958 criminal cases across the fifty states.…”
Section: Data and Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The data for this project has primarily been collected from the State Court Data Project (Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000) Within our data, we retained those cases that were complete in their information and in which the justices sat en banc. 19 This left a total of 5958 criminal cases across the fifty states.…”
Section: Data and Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000) developed an alternative strategy for measuring the ideology of state supreme court justices-Party Adjusted Ideology scores (PAJID). However, I could not locate a PAJID score for Justice N. Patrick Crooks.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the states chosen for partisan election and legislative selection were not random (as there are only four and two respectively), each other the other systems were randomized with certain conditions. They could not employ lifetime tenure, nor could they have switched method of (Brace, Hall, and Langer 2000) score and the state's respective Berry et al (1998) score. selection or retention during our timeline. This allows us more specifically to test our hypotheses.…”
Section: Specifying Models Of Tenure Length Of State Supreme Court Jumentioning
confidence: 99%