Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information

Sun, Huan; Wang, Haiyan; Steffensen, Sonja

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2021.102554

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…According to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979; Xiao & Shi, 2016), the platform can screen the type of live streamers by designing a menu of contracts that can reveal live streamers' true type, each of which is intended for a type‐ k live streamer. Then, each live streamer simultaneously and independently determines their prices and service efforts under the contracts they choose respectively (Sun et al, 2022). The decision process of the platform and live streamers is shown in Figure 2.…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…a type-k live streamer. Then, each live streamer simultaneously and independently determines their prices and service efforts under the contracts they choose respectively (Sun et al, 2022). The decision process of the platform and live streamers is shown in Figure 2.…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, platforms may have limited ability to verify true efforts of live streamers. To obtain lower commission rates and higher signing bonuses, some live streamers would hide their service abilities when contracting with platforms and then shirk effort, transferring their moral hazard to platforms (Sun et al, 2022). Therefore, adverse selection and moral hazard caused by dual asymmetric information can induce strategic behavior by live streamers and can result in inefficiencies and less desirable outcomes, which may harm interests of live streaming platforms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal contract design for live streaming platforms under dual asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

Zhang

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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When live streamers sell products to consumers on live streaming platforms, their abilities and service efforts are private, and thus, the issues of identifying their true abilities, motivating them to use appropriate service efforts, and providing a mechanism to allocate profits remain to be resolved for live streaming platforms. Adopting a principal–agent model, we investigate the optimal contract design between a live streaming platform and live streamers. In addition, we study the impacts of the price and service competition between live streamers and the platform's corporate social responsibility on the optimal contract design. The results show that high commission rates and low signing bonuses are not always beneficial to platforms, and the optimal contract design to identify the types of live streamers can make it more profitable. In addition, the utility‐maximizing platform always sets lower commission rates and signing bonuses compared with the profit‐maximizing platform. Regardless of the platform's goal, total profits and commission rates are higher under competition compared with no competition. For the government, policies and subsidies should be provided, such as regulating commission rates by setting a limited range and increasing subsidies for the marginal costs of live streaming platforms, which can effectively motivate live streaming platforms to enhance corporate social responsibility.

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Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal contract design for live streaming platforms under dual asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

Zhang

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

Self Cite

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“…When important market information is unique to one party in the supply chain, the other party can induce the disclosure of this information by means of contractual incentives. This involves studies on asymmetric information, such as those by Song et al (2017), Piccolo et al (2018), Shao et al (2020), Yang et al (2020), Cao and Chen (2021), Li et al (2022), Sun et al (2022). When relevant uncertainty is faced by all members of the supply chain, obtaining information and further updating cognition become important measures to reduce the uncertainty risk.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bunkering and information decisions in the sea cargo service industry based on uncertain spot price

Song

Chen

2023

Naval Research Logistics

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The pursuit of lower costs and the volatility of spot prices force shipping companies to sign fuel supply contracts with suppliers in advance. Meanwhile, suppliers that take on price risks typically seek further information on spot market prices. Furthermore, they need to consider whether to share the information with shipping companies as such information can affect shipping companies' decision on speed and, hence, their fuel consumption and shipper business. To study the refueling and information issues of the shipping supply chain, we describe a game between a shipping company and a supplier on the basis of a fuel supply contract. Results show that compared with the case without information sharing, the case with information sharing with a possibly lower spot price can bring higher profits for the shipping company and supplier. At this point, the shipping company will increase its navigation speed and benefit from the resulting increase in shipper business. Meanwhile, the supplier can benefit from the shipping company's increased fuel consumption. The supplier decides to share information with the shipping company before receiving signals only when the prediction accuracy is high, indicating that the supplier's prediction motivation is to sway the shipping company's risk assessment. Restricted by prediction costs, the supplier will not improve the prediction accuracy indefinitely, but such improvement can always benefit the shipping company. Hence, information prediction can be a win‐win strategy for the shipping company and supplier.

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“…Using a game-theoretic queuing model that characterizes equilibrium points, Li and Zou [27] identify optimal decisions for contract mechanisms. Incorporating mechanism design into actual health insurance scenarios, Sun et al [28] expand the concept of mechanism design. They present multi-strategy combination plans that align the interests of the healthcare system with patients.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Contract Mechanisms between the Government and Private Hospitals on the Social Utility

Teymourifar,

Kaya,

Ozturk

2023

Preprint

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In this work, we deal with a real healthcare system, in which public and private hospitals with different characteristics co-exist. While public hospitals have lower costs, they also suffer from long waiting times, diminishing the perceived quality of care for patients. Conversely, private hospitals, with their higher fees, offer shorter waiting periods, resulting in a more favorable perception of quality. A balanced healthcare system could offer societal benefits. Pricing strategies greatly influence a patient's hospital selection. For instance, reduced fees in private hospitals attract more patients, consequently reducing overcrowding in public facilities and elevating the overall quality of services provided. This study aims to develop pricing models to foster a balanced and socially advantageous healthcare system. Within this system, private hospital pricing is determined through contract mechanisms with the government. Thus, we delve into the ramifications of various contract models between the government and private hospitals on social utility. Our findings underscore the communal advantages of contract mechanisms. Furthermore, we generalize the proposed models to be applicable to similar systems.

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Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information

Cited by 11 publications

References 27 publications

Optimal contract design for live streaming platforms under dual asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

Optimal contract design for live streaming platforms under dual asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

Bunkering and information decisions in the sea cargo service industry based on uncertain spot price

The Effects of Contract Mechanisms between the Government and Private Hospitals on the Social Utility

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