Media Attention and Bureaucratic Responsiveness

Abstract

How does media attention shape bureaucratic behavior? We answer this question using novel data from the Mexican federal government. We first develop a new indicator for periods of anomalously heightened media attention, based on 150,000 news articles pertaining to 22 Mexican government ministries and agencies, and qualitatively categorize their themes. We then evaluate government responsiveness using administrative data on roughly 500,000 requests for government information over a 10-year period, with their associated responses. A panel fixed-effects approach demonstrates effects of media attention on the volume of outgoing weekly responses, while a second approach finds effects on the “queue” of information requests already filed when anomalous media attention begins. Consistent across these empirical approaches, we find that media attention shapes bureaucratic behavior. Positive or neutral attention is associated with reduced responsiveness, while the effects of negative attention vary, with attention to government failures leading to increased responsiveness but attention to corruption leading to reduced responsiveness. These patterns are consistent with mechanisms of reputation management, disclosure threat, and workload burden, but inconsistent with mechanisms of credit claiming or blame avoidance.

Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science

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“…Compliance with transparency requirements is inconsistent even in strong administrative systems and in low corruption environments (Lagunes, 2019; Michener & Nichter, 2021; Pasquier & Villeneuve, 2007; Worthy, 2017). Unsurprisingly, compliance is lower especially when it comes to politically sensitive information and when there is heightened attention to issues of corruption (Bagozzi et al., 2021; Berliner et al., 2021; Erlich et al., 2021). This is because both bureaucrats and politicians have incentives to avoid disclosure of sensitive information.…”

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“…Otherwise, committee members, a majority of whom are affiliated with the opposition party, are likely to further increase requests for documents, additional hearings, and more time for public participation, accompanied by substantive criticisms, which have been already directed at ideologically divergent agents (see Lowande and Potter 2021). Recent research on public attention and bureaucratic behavior suggests that negative attention from the media and the public may lead to increased bureaucratic responsiveness, due to the objectives of reputation management, because bureaucrats pursue strengthening their agencies' reputations for accountability with citizens and other governmental officials: where bureaucratic agencies are evaluated and subject to procedural scrutiny by oversight bodies, such as legislative committees, responsiveness to the latter's criticisms or actions has a significant effect on the former's reputations (Erlich et al 2021, 691).…”