Media Attention, Investor Attention and Corporate Innovation Investment: Empirical Study Based on China GEM Listed Companies

Impact of information risk and cost of equity: moderating role of investor attention

“…In highly attentive firms, the coefficient value of private information is positive and statistically significant, whereas it is considered negative in low-attentive firms. The findings are consistent with those of Wei and Mei (2019), indicating that that investor attention reduces the level of information asymmetry, increases investor readiness to invest in stocks and offers substantial external financial aid by increasing information efficiency.…”

“…However, it suggests that firms in my study are, on average, more crash-prone than those in these two studies. According to Wei and Mei's research, the average value of attention is 5.8321 (2019). The average liquidity value is −13.5068 shows that shares of firms listed on PSX are liquid.…”

“…By paying greater attention to publicly listed firms, monitoring managers' opportunistic conduct and relaxing corporate financing limitations, investors may assist in lowering the degree of information asymmetry with corporations, all of which influence corporate innovation and the actual economy. The dynamic search behaviour decreases information asymmetry between investors, companies and market pressure to establish an external reputation limitation method (Wei and Mei, 2019).…”

“…However, investor attention's effect is not only limited to investor's trading behaviour, information disclosure and interpretation but also on the company's investment decisions through information intermediation and market pressure effects. According to the information intermediation effect, investor attention plays a vital role in falling investor information risk, increasing investor trust and investment opportunities for corporate investment (Li and Zhu, 2011; Wei and Mei, 2019). Likewise, investor attention advances the level of a company's efforts to divulge information under the mechanism of the market pressure hypothesis.…”

“…Likewise, investor attention advances the level of a company's efforts to divulge information under the mechanism of the market pressure hypothesis. This mechanism condenses the degree of manipulative reporting and self-serving actions of the management via effective restrictions on management behaviour at the time of earning announcements (Tang and Zhuo, 2014; Wei and Mei, 2019). Therefore, this study poses another question: Does the investor attention-driven investment alter the relation between information risk and corporate investment.…”