Media technology, covert action, and the politics of exposure

Abstract

States wishing to use force in the modern era frequently face strong incentives to exploit secrecy. Successful covert operations can reduce the likelihood of unwanted escalation with powerful rivals and help leaders conceal unpopular actions from domestic and foreign audiences alike. The many benefits of secrecy, however, can only be realized if covert operations remain covert. We argue that access to information and communications technologies (ICTs) is a critical factor that increases the chances that a covert mission will be exposed. As a result, leaders are much less likely to reach for the quiet option when a potential target has dense ICT networks. We illustrate our mechanism through US national security archival vignettes. We test our argument using a dataset of declassified US military and electoral interventions intended to subvert incumbent regimes throughout the Cold War. The core finding, that leaders are less likely to pursue covert action relative to alternative options when the chances of exposure are high, holds across five distinct measures of ICT networks as well as different model specifications and placebo tests. Our findings suggest that Cold War-style covert operations may well be a thing of the past in an age where communication and media technologies have proliferated to the far corners of the globe. We advance debates on communications technologies, covert action, and political violence.

Grey is the new black: covert action and implausible deniability

“…Some scholars predict the demise of covert action, largely because increased exposure, caused by changes in the media and communications technology, erodes plausible deniability. 91 But this view rests on an assumption, challenged here, that robust plausible deniability was a key part of Cold War operations. Covert action is broader than current conceptions of plausible deniability allow.…”

“…50 ICT allows citizens to communicate, to collect evidence, and ultimately to compromise plausible deniability. 51 Meanwhile, state secrecy-and plausible deniability-is further challenged by a globalized civil society, with increased contact between legions of investigative journalists, human rights lawyers and whistleblowers. Claims about the 'end of secrecy' have been overstated, and governments are fighting back hard against journalists and whistleblowers; 52 Barack Obama's White House prosecuted twice as many whistleblowers under the 1917 Espionage Act as all previous presidents combined.…”

Private Eyes in the Sky: Emerging Technology and the Political Consequences of Eroding Government Secrecy

“…This information can subsequently reach audiences around the world via expanding internet and mobile networks. The ability of new technologies to expose sensitive activities may make states reluctant to initiate covert operations (Joseph and Poznansky 2018) or shrink the “backstage” where rivals tacitly collude in concealing each other’s covert activities to dampen escalatory pressures (Carson 2018).…”

“…Public preferences can, in turn, shape the behavior of democratic leaders, who often consider public opinion when making foreign policy (Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020). We explore whether non-government information-gathering technologies limit the government’s freedom of action in the foreign policy domain, contributing to debates on whether the proliferation of information sources makes it harder (Baum and Potter 2019) or easier (Joseph and Poznansky 2018) for publics to constrain leaders’ foreign policymaking.…”

Secrecy in International Relations and Foreign Policy

“…Do these new technologies cause secrets to lose value faster over time? Do leaders shift the methods by which they keep secrets, or the kinds of secrets they keep (Carson 2018, Joseph & Poznansky 2018 Carnegie 2015 andMilner &Tingley 2015). When do leaders pick secrecy to achieve their goals versus other methods of doing so?…”