Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger

Abstract

Two structural equation models are presented to examine the relationship between anger and blame. In the first model, attributions of blame mediate the relationship between feelings of anger and attributions concerning the provoker's intentions to harm, his or her justification in harming, and the amount of harm done. In the second model, anger and blame exist in a reciprocal relationship. The self-reports of 158 individuals concerning an incident in which they had been harmed were analyzed using LISREL VIII. Both models showed satisfactory fit to the data; however, on the basis of theory and past research, the second model is proposed as more acceptable. Additional analyses demonstrated that interactional injustice was the most often reported type of injustice and that men were more likely to be reported as the offender than women. Implications of the research are discussed and suggestions for future research are presented.

Moral emotions and the envisaging of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

“…For example, studies by Young and Saxe (2011) found that judgments of purity violations (e.g., incest) were less susceptible to manipulations of intentionality than judgments of harm (e.g., an act of incest was still wrong even if the actors did not know it was incest). Though very important, intentionality is only one factor among a number of factors that influence judgments of wrongdoing and blame (Monroe, Guglielmo, & Malle, 2012;Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). The present findings suggest that factors related to consent, cultural norms, romantic love, coercion, and even the symbolic meaning of the act (e.g., whether the actors were performing theatrically) were all recognized by a number of participants as influential in their judgments of purity violations.…”

“…Anger has long been understood as an emotional response to perceived wrongdoing, particularly intentional and unjustified harm, or acts of injustice, including violations of a person's rights (Averill, 1982;Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009;Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999;Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996;Rozin et al, 1999). Although there is some disagreement about the exact relationship between anger and judgments of wrongdoing or blame (i.e., whether anger precedes, co-occurs with, or follows from these judgments; see e.g., Averill, 1982;Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996;Weiner, 1995), the relationship is nonetheless robust, such that changes in moral judgment tend to reflect corresponding changes in anger, and vice versa (see pilot study discussed below).…”

“…Although there is some disagreement about the exact relationship between anger and judgments of wrongdoing or blame (i.e., whether anger precedes, co-occurs with, or follows from these judgments; see e.g., Averill, 1982;Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996;Weiner, 1995), the relationship is nonetheless robust, such that changes in moral judgment tend to reflect corresponding changes in anger, and vice versa (see pilot study discussed below). For example, anger provoked in one situation has been shown to "spill over" into orthogonal decisions about blame and punishment, but dissipate when relevant cues of justice are highlighted (see Goldberg et al, 1999).…”

“…For example, anger provoked in one situation has been shown to "spill over" into orthogonal decisions about blame and punishment, but dissipate when relevant cues of justice are highlighted (see Goldberg et al, 1999). At least three antecedent features of a harmful event seem to impact upon the intensity of anger: severity (Rule & Duker, 1973;Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, Running head: MORAL EMOTIONS AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 5 & Tedeschi, 1978), intentionality (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a), and justifiability (Hewitt, 1975;Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). Additionally, whether or not the act of harm was perceived to be avoidable or controllable may be a fourth antecedent, though findings for this dimension are less consistent (cf.…”

The devil you know: the effects of identifiability on punishment

“…Prior research has show that perceived intentional harm evokes anger (Bentacourt & Blair, 1992) as well as blame (e.g., Shaver, 1985), and that these two emotions interact with one-another. Anger, like sympathy, is a moral emotion, Identifiability and punitiveness 6 which can produce strong inferences of blame (Averill, 1983;Weiner, 1995); Blame, likewise, intensifies anger, such that anger and blame have a significant recursive relationship (Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1996). Moreover, reactions of anger and blame naturally induce a desire to punish (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998;Solomon, 1990).…”