Mediation and Conflict Prevention

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Bächtiger, André

doi:10.1177/0022002712448910

Cited by 19 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 50 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Most of these studies focus on resolving conflicts between individuals. Some mechanism that have been shown to be effective include communication between competing parties (Tingley and Walter, 2011;Cason et al, 2012), side-payments Sheremeta 2013, 2014), the use of a coordination device , costly commitments (Kimbrough et al, 2015), and mediation (Eisenkopf, 2015). In the context of group contests, only one of these conflict resolution mechanisms has been studied in the laboratory.…”

Section: Conflict Resolution and Endogenous Formation Of Alliancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research

Sheremeta

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team-incentives within firms, group sports, and rent-seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual efforts. However, since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free-ride on the efforts of other members. Contest theory shows that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of freeriding within groups depend on the group size, sharing rule, group impact function, contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. We review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions. Almost all studies of behavior in group contests find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the theory. We discuss potential explanations for such overexpenditure, including the utility of winning, bounded rationality, relative payoff maximization, parochial altruism, and social identity. Despite over-expenditure, most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory (with the exception of the "group size paradox"). Finally, studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote withingroup cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de-escalate and potentially eliminate between-group conflict.JEL Classifications: C7, C9, D7, H4, J4, K4, L2, M5

show abstract

Section: Conflict Resolution and Endogenous Formation Of Alliancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research

Sheremeta

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These findings also prompt reexamination of those studies that found that mediators perform better when they are biased (Zartman and Touval 1985;Kydd 2003) or powerful (Eisenkopf and B€ achtiger 2012;Beardsley 2013). Could it be that such mediators are successful because they are able to achieve a high level of recognition and argumentation rather than because of their bias or their power?…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Context and Content toward Consensus in Public Mediation

Itten¹

2017

Negotiation Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The mediation of public conflicts is a complex interactive, social‐psychological, and often politicized process. Because of their complexity, the literature on how to effectively mediate these conflicts remains imprecise. In this study, I have focused on the sequencing of the overall mediation process and the interplay between initial conditions, mediation styles, and process dynamics to explore predictable patterns from early stage to deadline negotiations. By undertaking a two‐step qualitative comparison of twenty‐three public mediation cases, I have attempted to identify “equifinal” pathways — that is, a variety of different ways in which the same outcome can be achieved — that can lead to mediation success (or failure). My analysis reveals that both inclusivity (i.e., including all relevant participants in the process) and mediation institutionalization (i.e., the mediation process is sufficiently embedded in the political and administrative system) correlate to greater mediation effectiveness. Furthermore, this study also suggests that such key elements of deliberative negotiations as recognition and argumentation are essential for reaching a consensual agreement.

show abstract

“…Rather, disadvantaged players seem to consider the proposed division inappropriate. 22 The result on the higher re- 21 Recall that, in Figure 3a, the exogenous share o¤ered to the players becomes lower when moving clockwise from A-Large to A-Small to B-Small to B-Large. 22 During the experiment a calculator was o¤ered on the screen as a help to compute win probabilities for possible e¤ort choices.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…22 The result on the higher re- 21 Recall that, in Figure 3a, the exogenous share o¤ered to the players becomes lower when moving clockwise from A-Large to A-Small to B-Small to B-Large. 22 During the experiment a calculator was o¤ered on the screen as a help to compute win probabilities for possible e¤ort choices. If we use the values entered for the co-player's e¤ort as a proxy for the individual beliefs about the actual e¤ort of the co-player, we can deduce the individuals' expected win probabilities (although with the caveat that not all subjects made use of the calculator).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Herbst

Konrad

Morath

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may www.econstor.euBalance of power and the propensity of con ‡ict February 27, 2015 AbstractWe study the role of an imbalance in …ghting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of con ‡ict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of con ‡ict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of con ‡ict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes re ‡ect the players' unequal …ghting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most e¢ cient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.JEL codes: C78, C91, D72, D74

show abstract

Mediation and Conflict Prevention

Cited by 19 publications

References 50 publications

Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research

Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research

Context and Content toward Consensus in Public Mediation

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About