2019
DOI: 10.1007/s00181-019-01674-9
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Medical providers as double agents in a universal health care system: evidence from generic pharmaceutical adoption in Taiwan

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Cited by 2 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The statistically significant estimates reveal the providers' agency problem, where the providers might not consider the patients' share of medical expenses when prescribing drugs. Tang and Wu (2020) also found this agency problem among hospital physicians. While their paper focuses on physicians' double agency problem that considers both patients' and payer's utility in their decision, the current paper focuses on the providers' heterogeneity in their agency problem.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The statistically significant estimates reveal the providers' agency problem, where the providers might not consider the patients' share of medical expenses when prescribing drugs. Tang and Wu (2020) also found this agency problem among hospital physicians. While their paper focuses on physicians' double agency problem that considers both patients' and payer's utility in their decision, the current paper focuses on the providers' heterogeneity in their agency problem.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…In the rest of the paper, I considered a physician as an owner if she was marked as legally obliged for her practicing facility in the basic information file in the National Health Insurance Research Database (NHIRD). Tang and Wu (2020) discussed in length about the incentive structure of the physicians in hospitals and clinics in Taiwan. While clinic owners are obviously responsive to their financial incentives, Cheng (2003) mentioned that most hospitals in Taiwan also provide their staff physicians incentives to generate more revenues.…”
Section: National Health Insurance In Taiwanmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another Taiwanese study also revealed that a larger price difference between brand‐name and generic drugs increased the number of generic prescriptions made by physicians, but that this effect decreased for physicians in large hospitals as the NHI program covered more of the cost. Larger hospitals have more power when negotiating the price of brand‐name medications than small hospitals or clinics, and thus pay less for brand‐name medication 45 . Patients also tend to choose brand‐name medications over generic medications as they do not consider generic medications to be equivalent to their brand‐name counterparts, and believe that brand‐name medications have fewer side effects 46–48 .…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Larger hospitals have more power when negotiating the price of brand‐name medications than small hospitals or clinics, and thus pay less for brand‐name medication. 45 Patients also tend to choose brand‐name medications over generic medications as they do not consider generic medications to be equivalent to their brand‐name counterparts, and believe that brand‐name medications have fewer side effects. 46 , 47 , 48 A general perception that cheaper drugs means lower quality has also been reported among patients, 49 and that patients are more accepting of generics for the treatment of minor illnesses but prefer branded medicines for serious health problems.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%