Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger

Abstract

If asked to generate a list of virtues, most people would not include meekness. So it is surprising that Hume not only deems it a virtue, but one whose "tendency to the good of society no one can doubt of." After explaining what Hume and his contemporaries meant by 'meekness', the paper proceeds to argue that meekness is a virtue we, too, should endorse. You are in the supermarket and you overhear two familiar voices talking in the next aisle. They belong to your neighbours, with whom you have always maintained a cordial relationship. So, putting a bottle of sesame oil into your shopping cart, you begin to move in their direction with the intention of saying hello. Just as you reach the end of the aisle, you realize they are talking about you. At the very same moment you hear one of them say that you are "such a meek person." How are you likely to respond?Your neighbour's remark might prompt any number of emotional responses, but pride will probably not be among them. To refer to someone as meek in common parlance is rare, but when it does occur, it is seldom a term of praise. Meekness is not widely discussed in contemporary moral philosophy either, but on those infrequent occasions when it is, it is generally assumed to be a vice. 1 At least in this case, common usage and philosophical usage line up fairly closely. To call someone meek is to suggest that he or she is timid. One may also be suggesting that the person is

The Expression of Anger in the Public Sphere

“…If valuing X is good, then anger in the appropriate circumstances is also good. 41 Second, anger plays an important motivational role in political action. Because anger is able to identify injustice, it is also able to motivate punitive and or preventative demands against the unjust treatment of others.…”

Contempt and the Cultivation of Character

“…(Daniel Kahneman calls the relevant biases the “halo effect” and “what you see is all there is” [Kahneman , 82–88]). This may be especially true vis‐à‐vis defensive emotional evaluations like contempt and anger, which seem to work on what Glen Pettigrove calls the smoke detector principle: “When responding to potential threats, [these emotions are] naturally set to generate many more false alarms than true ones” (Pettigrove ; he relates the principle to anger, not contempt). In light of the need to keep this natural propensity from eventuating in inapt contempt, Connie's openness to countervailing reasons (as required by Bell's reasonableness condition) may need to be a proactive openness, wherein she searches (mentally or otherwise, as is fitting) for a case against her contempt.…”

“…Love hopes the intention was not so. Is it clear, the design was evil too?—“Yet it might not spring from the settled temper of the heart, but from … some vehement temptation, which hurried the man beyond himself.” (Wesley , 246; also quoted in Pettigrove , 366)The generosity of love's vision, as expounded by Kierkegaard and Wesley, is akin to the proactive open‐mindedness and slowness to contemn that partially constitute Connie's virtue of contempt. But the motivation and ultimate orientation are different.…”

“…Love hopes the intention was not so. Is it clear, the design was evil too?—“Yet it might not spring from the settled temper of the heart, but from … some vehement temptation, which hurried the man beyond himself.” (Wesley , 246; also quoted in Pettigrove , 366)…”

Politics in a State of Nature

“…Without the prevalence of the proper "reactive attitudes" among a group, one could hardly say that the group lived by moral norms. But moral anger is volatile and corrosive stuff (Pettigrove 2012). Moral anger's epistemic vices are a powerful reason to put some distance between reactive attitudes and retributive responses.…”