Mehr für weniger Leistung? Experimentelle Ergebnisse bei wiederholten Entscheidungen unter nichtmonotonen Anreizen

Abstract

Overview■ In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non-monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non-monotonicity of the contract.■ Four treatments with differing information structures are analyzed: a neutral treamtent, a framing treatment, and two framing treatments with two players, agent and principal. Overall, the experiments confirm the model and show that the non-monotone contract has the desired incentive effects. Furthermore, principals strictly prefer the non-monotone contract over a monotone contract that would ex ante lead to a lower expected surplus for them. Observed learning behavior of agents accords with learning direction theory.■ Possible extensions of the experiments to analyze the impact of fairness and reciprocity in detail are discussed. In that respect, the study serves as a benchmark study to derive answers about the practical applicability of non-monotone pay schemes which are often viewed as non-plausible labor contracts. 351

The Monotonicity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation of Incentive Structures

“…In our experiment principals could choose between a theoretically optimal non-monotone and a theoretically sub-optimal monotone contract. In line with Lukas (2007a), our data demonstrate that agents virtually never reject contract offers and often choose high effort as intended by the principals. This behavior turns out to be quite robust against the different variations of our experimental design, though it is more pronounced under the monotone contract.…”

“…Our controlled variations of the baseline treatment allow us to investigate the influence of different features that are not only relevant to the labor-market context, but that could also help to reduce the complexity of the experimental situation. As such, the results might explain the differences between the experimental data obtained in Lukas (2007a) and the empirically observed predominance of monotone contracts. The second treatment ('framing with selected contract information', FS) differs from the first one only in that additional information about the contract type is given to the participants, i.e.…”

“…'No framing' means that subjects do not receive explicit information on the (non-)monotonicity property of the contract. In these respects, the treatment NFS is comparable to the 'framing principal' treatment employed by Lukas (2007a) in which framing refers to labeling a principal an 'employer' who selects a contract (a feature which is also used in our design); but in our treatment parameters were chosen in a way that the non-monotonicity is more explicit (i.e., in contract N), which increases practical relevance of results. Our controlled variations of the baseline treatment allow us to investigate the influence of different features that are not only relevant to the labor-market context, but that could also help to reduce the complexity of the experimental situation.…”

“…In addition, concerns for horizontal equity might prevent individual nonmonotone contracts because a violation of horizontal equity may undermine employee motivation (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988: 596). Motivated by this background, Lukas (2007a) directly compares the performance of monotone and nonmonotone contracts in a controlled laboratory experiment. He demonstrates that the majority of employers, in fact, select the non-monotone contract.…”

“…Keser and Willinger (2000) allow for non-monotone contracts, but these contracts do not represent (incentive-) compatible offers. Lukas (2007a) provides the first study on the effects of incentive compatible nonmonotone contracts. As mentioned above, some features relevant for real-world employment relationships are not included in his study, however.…”