Membership matters

Abstract

Unable to attract enough voluntary recruits, many rebel groups rely on force to fill their ranks. Given that the group used force to compel individuals to join, a coerced conscript would be presumed unlikely to be loyal and would be expected to desert at the first opportunity. Yet, groups that have relied on coerced recruitment retain their members just as well as, if not better than, rebel armies that rely on voluntary methods of recruitment. This is a puzzle. How do rebel groups maintain allegiance and prevent desertion, especially if they rely on abduction to staff their ranks? A recruit can be forced to join a rebel group, but continuing to rely on coercion to enforce retention is too costly and not sustainable. These groups must find a way to reduce the costs of retention. The solution to this puzzle rests in the mechanisms of socialization that shape the allegiance of forcibly recruited soldiers. Socialization mechanisms are traced through three outcomes: compliance (or Type 0 socialization), role learning (Type I socialization), and norm internalization (Type II socialization). Integrating socialization theory and a rational choice analysis demonstrates that mechanisms that alter preferences through Type II socialization are effective in retaining recruits; the highest level of retention occurs when several mechanisms work in concert. Illustrative case studies of the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, the Maoists in Nepal, and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) show that a reliance on child soldiers, group assets (pecuniary and non-pecuniary), organizational structure, and the nature of military contestation shape when different mechanisms are effective or not.

Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Rebel Group Fragmentation

“…In particular, leftist-or ethnicity-based groups that distribute public goods have strong social ties with the population, are able to ideologically rather than coercively persuade civilians thereby building a consensual relationship with locals, and are more cohesive (Staniland 2014;Mosinger 2018). In line with this, a third tactic groups draw on to ensure greater cohesion is indoctrination and norm internalization (Hoover Green 2016Green , 2018Gates 2017). Leaders institute socialization processes that ensure lieutenants, commanders, and combatants internalize group norms through political education and transformational experiences that alter beliefs and promote allegiance to the group.…”

Moving Through Conflict: Transit Migration and Rebel Capacity in Mali

“…Yet, coercion exacerbates the challenge of retaining members, as forced recruits are more likely to shirk and desert, resulting in combat inefficiency and risks of infiltration. Effective retention will either require a constant stream of inducements, a credible and severe punishment scheme, or an effective process of socialization and indoctrination (Gates 2017).…”

The impact of climate variability on children: The recruitment of boys and girls by rebel groups

“…As climate variability affects the availability – or the lack thereof – of resources, it is likely to influence the composition of a rebel group (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Fjelde & Von Uexkull, 2012) and, in turn, the demand for children. First, children are relatively cheap: they do not consume much food and are less likely to demand large payments in comparison to adults (Gates, 2017; Haer, Faulkner & Whitaker, 2020). Child recruitment during times of economic hardships is then also a cost-effective strategy.…”

“…Recruiting (voluntary or forcibly) children reduces operational costs as they are cheaper to feed and clothe. Moreover, limiting the number of members eligible for revenue-sharing, leaders maintain more for themselves and the armed struggle (Gates, 2017; Haer, Faulkner & Whitaker, 2020). Lastly, recruiting children might give armed actors advantages on the battlefield.…”