Membership Turnover in U. S. State Legislatures: 1931-1976

Shin, Kwang Seon; Jackson, John S.

doi:10.2307/439606

Cited by 33 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Turnover in state legislatures during 1925-35 was high; on average, over half of the legislators were first-time members, and only a handful of legislators served more than three or four terms. Turnover is generally lower in upper chambers than in lower chambers, in chambers with staggered terms (Shin and Jackson 1979), and in single-member districts than in multi-member districts (Niemi and Winsky 1987). Turnover in U.S. states began to decline steadily after the 1930s.…”

Section: Historical Patterns Of Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Legislative careers, however, were not always long. Some southern states such as Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Louisiana, and a few non-southern states such as Maine and Maryland had consistently high rates of turnover, whereas some urban, industrial, states such as New York, California, Illinois, and Massachusetts showed consistently lower rates of turnover (Shin and Jackson 1979). Election defeats were only partially responsible for this turnover, with inadequate compensation an important factor in voluntary retirements (Hyneman 1938a(Hyneman , 1938b.…”

Section: Historical Patterns Of Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The decline in turnover over time in the United States is studied by many authors (see, for example, Niemi and Winsky 1987;Rosenthal 1974;Shin and Jackson 1979;Moncrief, Niemi, andPowell 2004, 2008). The decline in turnover over time in the United States is studied by many authors (see, for example, Niemi and Winsky 1987;Rosenthal 1974;Shin and Jackson 1979;Moncrief, Niemi, andPowell 2004, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures

Uppal

Glazer

2014

Economic Inquiry

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An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income. In particular, turnover increases capital expenditure and income taxes, both of which may cause long-run distortions in the economy. Further, increased turnover, by resulting in inefficient fiscal policy, reduces long-term economic growth.

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Section: Historical Patterns Of Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Historical Patterns Of Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures

Uppal

Glazer

2014

Economic Inquiry

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“…American state legislatures exhibit a great deal of variation on these factors that may also affect the relationships I am exploring, (Squire 1993(Squire , 1997King 2000;Shin and Jackson 1979;Niemi and Winsky 1986) 1. Consider the current situation in the United States Senate.…”

Section: Appendix A: State Sample Representativenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cohesion or Reciprocity? Majority Party Strength and Minority Party Procedural Rights in the Legislative Process

Martorano

2004

State Politics Policy Q.

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What is the role of political parties in the development of legislative institutions? Recent studies have explored the expansion and contraction of minority party procedural rights in the United States Congress (Binder 1997;Dion 1997), but these studies reach contradictory conclusions. Binder, emphasizing reciprocity norms, argues that minority party procedural rights expand as the majority party loses strength, while Dion, emphasizing the notion that small majorities are cohesive, asserts that these rights contract under these conditions. I apply Binder's and Dion's arguments to state legislative lower houses and test them with a dataset of 336 state legislative sessions in 23 states. The relevant variation among state legislatures provides the leverage necessary to understand better the relationship between partisan politics and legislative rule adoption more generally. I conclude that in state legislatures, minority party procedural rights expand as the minority party shrinks in size.Scholars have long been interested in the development of legislative institutions (). These structures and procedures can affect both the process of lawmaking and the content of law (Rosenthal 1974;Hamm and Moncrief 1982;Hamm and Hedlund 1990;Cox 2000), so understanding their adoption and evolution is crucial to understanding the adoption and evolution of public policy. One aspect of legislative institutional development in the United States that many recent studies have examined is the role of political parties in this process (Wright and

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“…They have grown more professional, having longer sessions, better staffing, and increased potential to perform executive oversight (Jewell 1981). In a number of states, members are serving longer terms and are less likely to voluntarily retire (Shin and Jackson 1979;Niemi and Winsky 1987). Moreover, as these bodies become more professional, individual legislators are gaining greater visibility (Jewell 1982).…”

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confidence: 99%

Specifying the Impact of Incumbency On State Legislative Elections

Breaux

1990

American Politics Quarterly

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Prior research, based on the analysis of aggregate-level state legislative election data, has documented a decline in the marginality of state legislative districts. Over the past twenty or so years, state legislators, much like congressional incumbents, have been winning reelection by larger margins of the vote. By taking advantage of district-level, state legislative election data, the research presented here specifies the relative impact of incumbency on district marginality, while controlling for statewide party trends. More specifically, it follows the lead of congressional elections studies, examining the impact of retirement slump and sophomore surge on the legislative district vote. In general, the legislative district vote reflects both a retirement slump and a sophomore surge, with the magnitude of their impact being conditioned by the level of contested incumbent victories in a state.Since the mid-sixties, congressional incumbents have sought and won reelection at higher rates, and their margins of victory have increased over time (Erikson ). At the congressional district level, a party's share of the vote increases over its previous share when its freshman incumbent runs for a second term (i.e., sophomore surge), and decreases below its previous share when its incumbent does not run for reelection (i.e., retirement slump;Erikson 1971;Mann 1978).During the last decade, we have learned much from survey data about the incumbency advantage in congressional elections. The increased visibility of congressional members in such areas asThe author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism and Malcolm E. Jewell for his significant contribution to this research.

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Membership Turnover in U. S. State Legislatures: 1931-1976

Cited by 33 publications

References 5 publications

Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures

Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures

Cohesion or Reciprocity? Majority Party Strength and Minority Party Procedural Rights in the Legislative Process

Specifying the Impact of Incumbency On State Legislative Elections

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