Memory as Triage: Facing Up to the Hard Question of Memory

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

2022

Self Cite

In this paper, I argue that causal theories of memory are typically committed to two independent, non-mutually entailing theses. The first thesis pertains to the necessity of appropriate causation in memory, specifying a condition token memories need to satisfy. The second pertains to the explanation of memory reliability in causal terms, and it concerns memory as a type of mental state. Post-causal theories of memory can reject only the first (weak post-causalism) or both (strong post-causalism) theses. Upon this backdrop, I examine Werning’s (2020) causalist argument from probabilistic correlation. I argue that it doesn’t establish the necessity of appropriate causation, and thus it can only target strong post-causalist theories. I end up by presenting some general considerations, suggesting that memories may not always be causally linked to past experiences.

Section: Memory Systems Probability and Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Causation in memory: necessity, reliability and probability

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

2022

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“…The system also relies on general knowledge, including event schemas and scripts: representations that encode knowledge about what typically happens in events of a particular kind (Schank, 1982;Hard et al, 2006). What information is used, and how it is put to use, depends on the details of the context as well as the goals of the subject (Andonovski, 2021). As we have seen, context and goal structure can modulate the activity of ensembles of cells, enabling remapping.…”

Section: Episodic Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On a historically influential view, traces are structurally analogous to the events or experiences they represent, affording appropriate recall (Martin and Deutscher, 1966). This view faces a variety of problems, particularly in light of accumulating evidence of content transformation and (re)construction at all stages of memory processing (Schacter et al, 2012;Michaelian, 2016;Andonovski, 2021). As argued in section "Episodic representation: A mental models account, " episodic models are constructed at recall with information from a number of sources, with episodic traces being the most important one.…”

Section: Episodic Representation: What the Thesis Is Notmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The episodic system simulates a wide range of events, for a variety of cognitive tasks. To do so successfully, and in a flexible manner, the system needs to rely both on reinstatement of past neural patterns and on systematic processes of transformation of information acquired on different occasions (Stickgold and Walker, 2013;Andonovski, 2021).…”

Section: Episodic Simulation: Polishing the Common Corementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Episodic representation: A mental models account

2022

Front. Psychol.

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This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.

“…1 Their simulationist foes, emboldened by some surprising developments in the sciences of memory, have challenged this claim, insisting that such a causal connection is not necessary (Michaelian, 2016a;Michaelian & Sant'Anna, 2019). 2 While, from 10,000 feet, the two camps seem clearly distinct and well-fortified, a closer look reveals a surprisingly intricate terrain, crisscrossed by a number of unexplored routes between them (Andonovski, 2021;Langland-Hassan, 2021). Still, there is a growing suspicion that, in light of the empirical developments -and perhaps also the evolving nature of theorizing about memory-a "relaxation of the requirement for a strictly necessary and sufficient condition is welcome" (Lewis, 1966, p. 22).…”

Section: Fernández's Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causation and mnemonic roles: on Fernández’s Functionalism

2021

Estud.filos

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Debates about causation have dominated recent philosophy of memory. While causal theorists have argued that an appropriate causal connection to a past experience is necessary for remembering, their opponents have argued that this necessity condition needs to be relaxed. Recently, Jordi Fernández (2018; 2019) has attempted to provide such a relaxation. On his functionalist theory of remembering, a given state need not be caused by a past experience to qualify as a memory; it only has to realize the relevant functional role in the subject’s mental economy. In this comment, I argue that Fernández’s theory doesn’t advance the debate about memory causation. I propose that this debate is best understood as being about the existence of systems, which support kinds of interactions that map onto the relations dictated by (causal) theories. Since Fernández’s functionalism tells us very little about this empirical question, the theoretical gains from endorsing it are minimal.