Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with conditional selection on networks

Ye, Wenxing; Feng, Weiying; L, Chen; Fan, Shuxiang

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.02.035

Cited by 30 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…On the one hand, memory effects play an important role in an individual's decision-making process. For cooperative evolutionary research, it is assumed that individuals have the ability to store and recall previous information, and people make decisions more or less based on their previous experience and recorded historical information [16,17]. For example, some ants forage for food based on their own experience rather than imitating other ants [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Lu,

Dai

2023

New J. Phys.

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Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M, and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M. Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Lu,

Dai

2023

New J. Phys.

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“…It is found that this kind of network structure plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In addition, a large number of mechanisms of promoting cooperation have been recently proposed by considering the social factor, such as rewards and punishments [22,23], reputation [24], aspiration [25], tolerance [26], teaching activity [27], memory [28][29][30], emotion [31][32][33], rationality [34,35], restructuring partnership [36], migration [37] and so forth. Additionally, interdependent networks have been considered to be a more suitable framework for the investigation of networked cooperative dynamics, and seemingly insignificant factors in one network can lead to the extraordinary consequences in another network [38][39][40].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Degree of satisfaction-based adaptive interaction in spatial Prisoner’s dilemma

Dang

Zhang

et al. 2022

Nonlinear Dyn

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To study why the altruistic cooperation behavior can emerge and maintain among egoistical individuals, researchers across several disciplines have made great contributions for the solutions of this fascinating problem. Ordinarily, the spatial structure is a most-often used framework to investigate the cooperative dynamics of evolutionary game. However, very few researchers take into account the reaction of evolutionary game dynamics to interactive intensity between individuals. On account of this, we propose a computational model of automatic adjustment the interactive intensity based on individual's degree of satisfaction to study the iterated prisoner's dilemma game in a twodimensional square lattice. In this model, selfish individual considers whether the benefits obtained from the other party satisfies its own requirements to determine the intensity of interaction from it to the other party. More specifically, the interactive intensity from an individual x to its some neighbor y is driven by the relations between x obtained current benefit from y (denoted by P x⇀y ) and x's satisfaction payoff (denoted by S p ). If P x⇀y > S p , x will increase the intensity of interaction from itself to y; On the contrary, if P x⇀y < S p , x will weaken the intensity of interaction; Other scenario remain the same. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively promote the emergence and maintain of cooperation in population, and the satisfying coefficient α (0 < α < 1) plays an essential role on

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“…In fact, the argument behind the non-markov effect is well-acknowledged that the decision-making for individuals is based on the knowledge of the past records rather than a single round [34]. Plenty of theoretical works show that memory can considerably improve the cooperation level [35][36][37][38], and several related factors such as the length of memory, the temptation of defection, and the structure of networks have been studied [37,[39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46]. The impact of incomplete information scenario, where players do not possess full information about their opponents, has also been investigated separately in previous studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oscillatory cooperation prevalence emerges from misperception

Zhang¹,

Zhao²,

Zhang³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Oscillatory behaviors are ubiquitous in nature and the human society. However, most previous works fail to reproduce them in the two-strategy game-theoretical models.Here we show that oscillatory behaviors naturally emerge if incomplete information is incorporated into the cooperation evolution of a non-Markov model. Specifically, we consider a population playing prisoner's dilemma game, where each individual can only probabilistically get access to their neighbors' payoff information and store them within their memory with a given length. They make their decisions based upon these memories. Interestingly, we find that the level of cooperation generally cannot stabilize but render quasiperiodic oscillation, and this observation is strengthened for a longer memory and a smaller information acquisition probability. The mechanism uncovered shows that there are misperceived payoffs about the player's neighborhood, facilitating the growth of cooperators and defectors at different stages that leads to oscillatory behaviors as a result. Our findings are robust to the underlying structure of the population. Given the omnipresence of incomplete information, our findings may provide a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of oscillatory behaviors in the real world.

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Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with conditional selection on networks

Cited by 30 publications

References 46 publications

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Degree of satisfaction-based adaptive interaction in spatial Prisoner’s dilemma

Oscillatory cooperation prevalence emerges from misperception

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