Menace Without Mandate? Is There Any Sympathy for “Dissident” Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?

Abstract

Dissident Irish republicans have increased their violent activities

Risk Factors for Violent Dissident Republican Incidents in Belfast: A Comparison of Bombings and Bomb Hoaxes

“…Since then, the Republican threat has instead emerged from multiple and distinct dissident groups who reject the constitutional compromise accepted by PIRA leadership. Collectively, dissident Republican organizations maintain that the only acceptable outcome is the complete reunification of the island of Ireland (Frampton 2011(Frampton , 2012Evans and Tonge 2012). They also take the view that PIRA and its political wing, Sinn Féin, have become collaborators with the British state particularly through their endorsement of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).…”

“…These groups, including the Continuity IRA and the New IRA, have continued their paramilitary campaigns in the aftermath of 1998s Good Friday Agreement which ostensibly brought an end to the 29-year conflict known as 'the Troubles'. They want to demonstrate that the peace process has failed and regard violence as a legitimate means of achieving a united Ireland (Frampton 2011(Frampton , 2012Bean 2012;Evans and Tonge 2012).…”

From “former comrades” to “near enemy”: the narrative template of “armed struggle” and conflicting discourses on Violent Dissident Irish Republican activity (VDR)

“…Even the 1916 rebels-turned-heroes were "unrepresentative of public political opinion" (English 2006: 262). The same applied to the 'Border Campaign' (Hanley and Millar 2009) and, to a lesser degree, the Provisionals too (Tonge 2012). Former Provisionals nevertheless argue that, unlike VDR groups today, they had a "mandate" from their community even before Sinn Fein contested elections (Interviewee 8) and the backing of a "strong movement" sustained by communal support (Interviewee 2).…”

“…Admittedly VDR does not ostensibly have the considerable support -electoral or otherwisethat the Provisionals had but sympathy for it is higher than the Sinn Fein discourse suggests (Evans and Tonge 2012 Invoking this purist narrative template accentuates the observed reality that 'armed struggle' has always been a minority pursuit. Even the 1916 rebels-turned-heroes were "unrepresentative of public political opinion" (English 2006: 262).…”

“…In this context VDR represents "outside spoiler" violence designed to spoil any internal settlement on the basis of principled opposition to it (Zahar 2008). Tonge (2012) has noted that when militant republicans have been marginalised and made politically irrelevant by larger sections entering politics the trend is one of "seeking refuge in historical dogma" via an "inevitability of struggle" thesis. This suggests that justification for VDR is constructed through what Gurr (2011: 170) identified as a "violence-expectancy-justification-violence" nexus whereby failure to address underlying issues coupled with experiences of past violence creates an expectation of and historic justification for current and future violence.…”