Menger, Carl: Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre

Milford, Karl

doi:10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_15743-1

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…We would like to investigate whether the two objects of analysis, which we consider separately as “shareholder orientation” and “Rappaport's shareholder value,” are consistent with a market order. Our analytical framework is based on a few concepts that can be considered fundamental to the capitalist view: People exchange goods voluntarily to improve their present situation; they do so when the gift is valued individually higher than the counter‐gift (Bentham, 2000 [1823]; Block, 1973; Menger, 2007 [1871]; von Mises, 1944, 1998 [1949]). They have objectives but can only realize them by using scarce resources (Block, 1973; Menger, 2007 [1871]; von Mises, 1998 [1949]). The subjective value of an individual in general, as well as the values expected by entrepreneurs (e.g., Bylund & Packard, 2022), is determined by the marginal utility (Gossen, 1854; Jevons, 1871; Menger, 1871; von Böhm‐Bawerk, 1921; von Wieser, 1900; Walras, 1874). From a subjective perspective, it does not make sense to try to measure the value from an external perspective (e.g., Menger, 2007 [1871]; Mises, 1953 [1920]: 38, 1998 [1949]: 205; Rothbard, 2009 [1970]: 19) as there “is no universal unit to gauge personal satisfaction” objectively (Bylund & Packard, 2022: 1246). Nevertheless, the decision‐maker in a company needs an economic calculation tool to compute critical prices (Herbener & Rapp, 2016: 8), but von Mises (1998) [1949:329] distinguishes such an appraisal/appraisement from valuation, as it does not value the subjective use, but anticipates the market prices: “Valuation is a value judgment expressive of a difference in value.…”

Section: A Critique On Rappaport's Shareholder Value Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dark side of shareholder orientation: A reflection of Rappaport's concept of shareholder value

2023

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The concept of shareholder value has been the subject of heated debate for 40 years. Surprisingly, the literature seems to overlook the fact that shareholder orientation by management is something completely different from the implementation of this idea in the well‐known shareholder value concept, which aims to measure the contribution of management to shareholder welfare. Using a market‐oriented framework, this study shows that the fundamental orientation of shareholders' subjective preferences is supported by a property rights perspective inspired by the ideas of the Austrian School of Economics. In contrast, Alfred Rappaport's shareholder value concept is based on neoclassical equilibrium thinking and, therefore, counteracts the real, imperfect environment of the corporation's decision‐makers, especially their subjective values. This results from individual preferences and decision parameters, as well as incomplete and asymmetric information. Thus, it ignores the reality of managerial decision‐making. Based on these considerations, we argue that the advocacy of a general managerial orientation toward shareholders' objectives does not logically imply full support for the implementation of the idea under Rappaport's concept. In doing so, this essay contributes to a more differentiated discussion on valuation, corporate governance, and managerial decisions.

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Section: A Critique On Rappaport's Shareholder Value Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dark side of shareholder orientation: A reflection of Rappaport's concept of shareholder value

2023

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“…Economic theory assumes that market participants are guided by the goal of satisfying their needs (e.g., Smith, 1776;von Hayek, 1973b). They value the exchange of goods and services based on their subjective preferences and are constrained by their specific possibility space (Menger, 1871;von Mises, 1998von Mises, [1949). This approach allows the transfer of economic thinking to all human activities and related social situations (Becker, 1976;Frey, 1990).…”

Section: Markets For Political Services Imperfections and Agenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This thesis can be easily justified from an economic perspective if we assume that a few characteristics are correct. Political actors are, like others, primarily interested in satisfying their own needs (e.g., Downs, 1957;Frey, 1994;Kirchgässner, 2013;Menger, 1871;Schumpeter, 1942Schumpeter, [2003; Smith, 1776;von Mises, 1998von Mises, [1949). Moreover, they have a high preference for the present (e.g., Hoppe, 1994) and are better informed than citizens (e.g., Daumann, 1999;Daumann & Follert, 2020;Downs, 1957).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning from corporate governance: First conceptualization of a liability for political decision‐making

Follert

2023

Kyklos

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The institution of liability serves to mitigate the lack of care in almost all areas, whether private or business. However, we have not yet found such an institution in political decision‐making. Surprisingly, the literature has not discussed a specific institution that subjects political actors who fail to exercise due diligence in their decision‐making regarding personal liability. Hence, this paper aims to fill this gap and derive the necessity of internalizing the negative effects resulting from the imperfections of the market for political services in general and the democratic process, particularly by a liability rule. To design the new institution, we draw on the findings of corporate governance, combining economic thinking in incentives and legal knowledge expressed in the law of the corporation. In this respect, this paper is the first to make a concrete proposal for political liability accompanied by a political judgment rule. However, it is important to emphasize that the aim is not to punish a wrong decision but to provide strong incentives to prevent it ex ante. Political liability must be understood as a process‐oriented institution that considers uncertainty and decision‐making complexities. By proposing and analyzing this new institution, this work contributes to a broader discussion of incentive structures in the political process of modern democracies and shows how the political sphere can learn from the corporate world.

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“…Thus, neither sanctions nor power is effective. Individual sellers with goods of inferior marketability (Menger, 1871) relative to the money held by the buyer are placed in a relatively weak position. Because of its fragility, social exchange is practiced as a marketing activity with the expectation of securing sustainable transactions.…”

Section: Incidental Social Exchange 1) Social Exchange That Accompani...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion & Philosophy 2023 Official Conference Proceedings

2023

ACERP Official Conference Proceedings

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Although it is common to assume that monotheism grows naturally from polytheism, each of these religious systems presents, in fact, a distinct and sustainable product of spiritual evolution. The main question that arises in this respect is whether such distinctness and sustainability should result in mutual incompatibility and lack of common grounds or whether the two systems could remain dependent on each other both in substance and in form. In terms of substance, it may be more rewarding to approach the evolution of religion not as a headway progress from inferior to superior but as an evolving response to changes of the scope within which the numinous is perceived by human beings. The author believes that this scope is mostly determined by the predominant social unit within which a given religion is professed and practiced. Thus, animism operates chiefly within the context of extended family; mature polytheism corresponds to the level of clan/tribe, while monotheism proper belongs to the scale of nation/empire. As regards the corresponding evolution of the form, one can say that the above succession/expansion of scope results in a situation where newer religions tend to borrow and assimilate their signs and symbols from their predecessors. This creates a relationship of semiotic interdependence between different systems, which is, however, never perfectly symmetrical due to monotheism's more stronger propensity towards 'religiophagia'. Yet the latter's current tendency towards greater reflection and selfexamination inspires cautious optimism with respect to an improved probability of eventual interreligious harmony.

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Menger, Carl: Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

The dark side of shareholder orientation: A reflection of Rappaport's concept of shareholder value

The dark side of shareholder orientation: A reflection of Rappaport's concept of shareholder value

Learning from corporate governance: First conceptualization of a liability for political decision‐making

The Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion & Philosophy 2023 Official Conference Proceedings

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