Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: Much ado about nothing

“…The volitional construct (could notkould control impulses and actions) ranks fourth and thiid as an NGRI and Guilty construct respectively. Of note here are two constructs that have been largely overlooked, save for Fingarette (Fiigarette, 1972;Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). The nonculpable/culpable actions construct ranks first as a Guilty construct; and the incapacitylcapacity construct ranks second as an NGRI construct and second as a Guilty construct, thus having the broadest relevance and centrality across cases and verdicts.…”

“…The factors for Guilty and NGRI represent seven construct dimensions. These particular factors were selected because they (1) bore some relationship to factors used in existing insanity tests (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979); (2) were general, as opposed to case specific; and (3) proved to be moderately reliable (i.e., 81.7% agreement when single constructs were invoked, 70.9% agreement when multiple constructs were invoked) in previous research (Finkel & Handel, 1989).…”

“…In one experiment (Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, & Koch, 1985) Fingarette and Hasse's (1979) disability of mind (DOM) test. The investigators found no significant differences among the tests in regard to the mock jurors' verdicts on five "insanity" cases.…”

Retributive justifications for jail diversion of individuals with mental disorder

“…524–525). Recognizing that irrationality warrants lessened criminal responsibility, Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse () have proposed a “partial disability of mind” defense calling for mitigation when the finder of fact concludes that the defendant lacked the mental capacity for rational conduct in relation to the criminal significance of her act and where that lack of capacity “played a material role but not the chief or the predominant role in the defendant's commission of the alleged criminal act” (p. 265). A jury's finding of “partial disability of the mind” would not affect the defendant's degree of criminal liability but would require the sentencing judge to mitigate the defendant's punishment within her discretion (Fingarette & Hasse, , p. 245).…”

Addiction, choice, and criminal law

“…Characterizing a return to maladaptive behavior as a "relapse" begs the question of whether the behavior is the sign or a symptom of a disease. The latter must be established first in order properly to refer to the return as a "relapse" (Fingarette and Hasse 1979). Whether addiction should be considered a disease like any other is still an open question.…”