Mental files and belief: A cognitive theory of how children represent belief and its intensionality

Abstract

We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent's absence the ball was taken from box 1, the child was reminded of it being a rattle, and emphasising its being a rattle it was put back into box 1. Then the agent returned, the object was hidden in the experimenter's hands and removed from box 1, described as a "rattle," and transferred to box 2. Children who passed false belief had no problem saying where the puppet would look for the ball. However, in a different condition in which the agent was also shown that the ball was a rattle they erroneously said that the agent would look for the ball in box 1, ignoring the agent's knowledge of the identity of rattle and ball. Their problems cease with their mastery of second-order beliefs (she thinks she knows). Problems also vanish when the ball is described not as a rattle but as a thing that rattles. We describe how our theory can account for these data as well as all other relevant data in the literature.

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

“…Hence, much more is needed in addition to vigilance, and mentalizing is the critical component. The present task actually follows the typical change-in-location task structure that has been widely used in past studies to measure false belief understanding (Geangu et al, 2013;Meinhardt, K€ uhn-Popp, Sommer, & Sodian, 2012;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;Perner, Huemer, & Leahy, 2015;Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).…”

The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding

“…Response account Baillargeon et al (2010) Pragmatic development account Westra (2016) Triple mindreading Carruthers (2013Carruthers ( , 2016 Theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) Leslie et al (2004) Neutral Differential task demands view Rubio-Fernández (2013) Situational mental files account Newen and Wolf (this paper) Empiricist Two systems account Butterfill (2009), Butterfill andApperly (2013) Submentalizing/cognitive gadgets Heyes (2014Heyes ( , 2018) Child scientist -theory revision Gopnik (1993), Gopnik andWellman (1992, 2012), Wellman (2014) Behaviour rules and meta-representation Perner et al (1987), Perner (1991) Mental files Perner et al (2015), Perner and Leahy (2016) Dual systems association account De Bruin and Newen (2012) For the purposes of this paper, we want to remain neutral concerning the nativist/ empiricist debate. 5 Although we will be making use of the mental files framework from Perner et al (2015) and Perner and Leahy (2016) who do not advocate a nativist position, it is not clear whether the development of the ability to link mental files has to be a domain specific development in terms of a specifically developing understanding of belief, or whether this is also something which can be cashed out in terms of the development of domain general processes (e.g. working memory, executive function, or even a 'decoupling mechanism' as advocated by Leslie 1987).…”

“…We have nonetheless classed them as empiricists as they too argue for a cognitive development in terms of children's understanding of belief itself underlying the shift in performance at 4 years of age. Ruffman 2005;Perner et al 2015;Perner and Leahy 2016;Wellman 2014). The challenge for these views then lies in explaining why much younger infants are nonetheless able to pass the implicit FBT.…”

“…Most accounts are purely cached in terms of an internal cognitive development or reorganization which leads to a full-blown representation of beliefs (e.g. Perner 1991;Perner et al 2015;Perner and Leahy 2016;Apperly and Butterfill 2009;Perner and Ruffman 2005;De Bruin and Newen 2012). There are, however, also accounts such as Heyes' (2014Heyes' ( , 2018 which consider the role of situational factors in development.…”

The lexical pragmatics of count-mass polysemy

“…its phonological and syntactic properties), and (ii) encyclopaedic information associated with the entity that the concept stands in a referential relation to, that is, a set of conceptually represented assumptions and beliefs, including stereotypes and culture-specific information, and also, in many cases, imagistic and/or sensory-perceptual representations (Sperber & Wilson 1986. The idea that concepts are associated with encyclopaedic entries is broadly equivalent to the notion of mental files recently introduced in philosophy and experimental psychology (Fodor 2008, Recanati 2012, Perner et al 2015. 27 For instance, an encyclopaedic entry (or mental file) associated with the concept LION might plausibly include some of the following assumptions about the entity it picks out, which may be used in inferences involving the concept: Relevance Theory sees lexical interpretation as typically involving the construction of occasion-specific ad hoc concepts, which may be narrower or broader than the linguistically encoded concepts (Carston 2002, Wilson & Carston 2006, Wilson & Sperber 2012.…”