Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality

Perner, Josef; Leahy, Brian

doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0235-6

Cited by 26 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Response account Baillargeon et al (2010) Pragmatic development account Westra (2016) Triple mindreading Carruthers (2013Carruthers ( , 2016 Theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) Leslie et al (2004) Neutral Differential task demands view Rubio-Fernández (2013) Situational mental files account Newen and Wolf (this paper) Empiricist Two systems account Butterfill (2009), Butterfill andApperly (2013) Submentalizing/cognitive gadgets Heyes (2014Heyes ( , 2018) Child scientist -theory revision Gopnik (1993), Gopnik andWellman (1992, 2012), Wellman (2014) Behaviour rules and meta-representation Perner et al (1987), Perner (1991) Mental files Perner et al (2015), Perner and Leahy (2016) Dual systems association account De Bruin and Newen (2012) For the purposes of this paper, we want to remain neutral concerning the nativist/ empiricist debate. 5 Although we will be making use of the mental files framework from Perner et al (2015) and Perner and Leahy (2016) who do not advocate a nativist position, it is not clear whether the development of the ability to link mental files has to be a domain specific development in terms of a specifically developing understanding of belief, or whether this is also something which can be cashed out in terms of the development of domain general processes (e.g. working memory, executive function, or even a 'decoupling mechanism' as advocated by Leslie 1987).…”

Section: Cognitive and Situational Accounts Of False Belief Understanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have nonetheless classed them as empiricists as they too argue for a cognitive development in terms of children's understanding of belief itself underlying the shift in performance at 4 years of age. Ruffman 2005;Perner et al 2015;Perner and Leahy 2016;Wellman 2014). The challenge for these views then lies in explaining why much younger infants are nonetheless able to pass the implicit FBT.…”

Section: Cognitive and Situational Accounts Of False Belief Understanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most accounts are purely cached in terms of an internal cognitive development or reorganization which leads to a full-blown representation of beliefs (e.g. Perner 1991;Perner et al 2015;Perner and Leahy 2016;Apperly and Butterfill 2009;Perner and Ruffman 2005;De Bruin and Newen 2012). There are, however, also accounts such as Heyes' (2014Heyes' ( , 2018 which consider the role of situational factors in development.…”

Section: Cognitive and Situational Accounts Of False Belief Understanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 The mental file is anchored in the object am able to retrieve the information from the file of the silver pen on my desk and thus tell her where her pen is. Perner and Leahy (2016), who have argued for the use of mental files as a tool for thinking about cognitive development, apply this idea to representing other people's beliefs. The key idea, they argue, is that we not only have 'regular files' which are representations of our own perspective of the world, but that we also have 'vicarious files' which are indexed to another person and instead represent their perspective on the world.…”

Section: Mental Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Applying this to the FBT, this means that the child has two representations (or mental files) of the situation: one regular file with the information that the chocolate is in the green box, and one vicarious file indexed to Maxi with the information that the chocolate is in the blue cupboard. The problem, Perner and Leahy (2016) argue, is that children below the age of 4 are not yet able to link mental files (Fig. 4a).…”

Section: Mental Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding

Newen

Wolf

2020

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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How can we solve the paradox of false-belief understanding: if infants pass the implicit false belief task (FBT) by nonverbal behavioural responses why do they nonetheless typically fail the explicit FBT till they are 4 years old? Starting with the divide between situational and cognitive accounts of the development of false-belief understanding, we argue that we need to consider both situational and internal cognitive factors together and describe their interaction to adequately explain the development of children's Theory of Mind (ToM) ability. We then argue that a further challenge is raised for existing accounts by helping behaviour versions of the FBT. We argue that the common two-stage accounts are inadequate: we need to allow for three central stages in a continuous development. Furthermore, drawing on Perner et al. 's (Cognition 145: 77-88, 2015) and Perner and Leahy's (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 491-508, 2016) recent mental files account, we provide a new account of the development of these three stages of ToM ability by describing the changes of the structure and organisation of mental files including the systematic triggering role of types of situations. Thereby we aim to establish a situational mental file (SMF) account as a new and adequate solution to the paradox of false-belief understanding.

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