Mental models and the suppositional account of conditionals.

Abstract

The mental model theory of conditional reasoning presented by P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) has recently been the subject of criticisms (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, D. E. Over, & S. J. Handley, 2005). The authors argue that the theoretical conflict can be resolved by differentiating 2 kinds of reasoning, reasoning about possibilities given the truth of assertions and reasoning about the truth of assertions given possibilities. The standard mental model theory accounts for the former kind of reasoning but does not adequately account for the latter, contrary to the suppositional approach favored by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. (2005). The authors thus propose a modified mental model theory of conditionals that reconciles the 2 theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that this theory is able to explain the key findings that have been opposed to the standard theory by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. and makes new predictions that are empirically verified.

Probability in reasoning: A developmental test on conditionals

“…Finally, older adolescents and adults who construct a three-model representation by adding two models (i.e., : p : q, and : p q) should deem the conditional true for p & q cases, false for p & not-q cases, not-p cases being judged as irrelevant, a response pattern corresponding to the well-known defective 1 or De Finetti truth-table of the conditional. These predictions have been verified in several studies (Barrouillet et al, 2008;Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009. In the same way, our theory makes straightforward predictions concerning the probability task.…”

“…Importantly, our theory departs from the traditional mental model approach by assuming different epistemological statuses for the different types of models constructed (Barrouillet et al, 2008). Whereas the conditional is deemed true for those cases that match the initial model that comes spontaneously to mind, the alternative models constructed through fleshing out have a different status.…”

“…In the following, we will try to derive developmental predictions from one of the most coherent theoretical frameworks pertaining to the new paradigm, namely suppositional theory of conditional along with the heuristic-analytic approach (Evans, 2006) as its algorithmic counterpart. These predictions will be compared to those that can be derived from our own revised mental model theory of conditional concerning its probability (Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008;Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009, 2014b). …”

Educating the Developing Mind: Towards an Overarching Paradigm

“…3) that with increasing developmental level of inductive and deductive reasoning, reaction times to speed and control of processing tasks decreased and working memory capacity increased. In line with these findings, Barouillet and colleagues (Barrouillet et al 2000(Barrouillet et al , 2008Markovits and Barrouillet 2002) showed that the development of deductive reasoning is a process of constructing mental models for real problems based on the content and knowledge available. The complexity of the models depends on working memory because more capacity allows for more models and more pointers from them to information in long-term memory.…”

Mental models and human reasoning

“…The model theory postulates that the meaning of clauses and knowledge can modulate the interpretation of connectives so that that they diverge from logical interpretations (57). Evidence bears out the occurrence of such modulations (58), and independent experimental results corroborate the model theory of conditionals (59)(60)(61)(62). Critics, however, have yet to be convinced (63, but cf.…”