Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation

Shrestha, Ratna K.

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.11.008

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By studying a hierarchical model of environmental regulation and enforcement, Arguedas and Rousseau [15] investigate the national regulator and the monitoring decision made by a local enforcement agency. In addition, Shrestha [16] designs an incentive mechanism in which the regulator provides a menu of linear price-quantity contracts to each firm. Lika et al [17] study incentive water pricing schemes under asymmetric information by using a principal-agent model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Incentive Contract Design for Supply Chain Enterprise’s Pollution Abatement with Carbon Tax

Zhou

Wang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper applies mechanism design to the supply chain enterprise’s pollution abatement problem with carbon tax. To maximize the government’s expected utility, an uncertain contract model is presented in the framework of principal-agent theory, where the government’s assessment of the supply chain enterprise’s carbon emission level is described as an uncertain variable. Afterwards, the equivalent model is provided to obtain the optimal contract for the uncertain pollution abatement problem. The results demonstrate that the supply chain enterprise’s optimal output decreases with the carbon emission level. Furthermore, the government’s optimal transfer payment decreases with the carbon emission level if the carbon tax is low. In contrast, if the carbon tax is high, the optimal transfer payment increases with the carbon emission level. In addition, an increase in the carbon emission level decreases the optimal utilities of both the government and the supply chain enterprise and also leads to the supply chain enterprise’s incremental marginal utility. Finally, we provide a numerical example, which illustrates the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed model.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Referring to some literature [8,13,16], we also assume that an increase in the supply chain enterprise's output and carbon emission level will increase the production cost.…”

Section: Mathematical Problems In Engineeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Contract Design for Supply Chain Enterprise’s Pollution Abatement with Carbon Tax

Zhou

Wang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Green supply chain decision modeling under financial policy, with or without uniform government emission reduction policy

Zhang

Liu

et al. 2020

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates green supply chain decision making under different government policies. The problem is explored under centralized and decentralized scenarios. We verified the advantages of simultaneous government implementation of financial and uniform manufacturing policies and found that, with increased public awareness of environmental protection, government subsidy also increases: when environmental protection awareness is sufficiently strong, the government does not have to set uniform policy. Finally, by parametric and numerical analyses, our research identified the conditions under which social welfare is maximized. The results facilitate scientific policy development and provide a reference for promoting green supply chain operations.

show abstract

An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits

Khezr

MacKenzie

2021

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Incentive Contract Design for Supply Chain Enterprise’s Pollution Abatement with Carbon Tax

Incentive Contract Design for Supply Chain Enterprise’s Pollution Abatement with Carbon Tax

Green supply chain decision modeling under financial policy, with or without uniform government emission reduction policy

An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About