Mereology

Lando, Giorgio

doi:10.1093/pq/pqac074

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…7 No obstante, es posible restringir el dominio de cuantificación de la teoría. Por ejemplo, Lando (2017) asume que los axiomas de CEM aplican exclusivamente para el caso de entidades concretas, independiente de qué entidades concretas haya. autores adhieren a CEM, tales como Lando (2017), Lewis (1991) y Varzi (2000.…”

Section: Nociones Generalesunclassified

See 1 more Smart Citation

¿Es un todo prioritario a sus partes?

Briones

2023

Anál. Filos.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal exponer un problema de coherencia presente en las teorías que plantean que los todos mereológicos son prioritarios a las partes que lo componen. El argumento central consiste en mostrar que la dependencia de identidad que las partes tienen con los todos que componen —que define la prioridad ontológica del todo respecto a sus partes— implica un principio de identidad a partir del cual se puede establecer que los todos, a su vez, dependen para su identidad de sus partes, por lo tanto las partes son ontológicamente prioritarias respecto al todo que componen. Así, la teoría colapsa en un círculo vicioso que atenta contra la noción misma de dependencia de identidad. Por esta razón, la teoría no puede sostener de manera coherente la tesis de que los todos son ontológicamente prioritarios a sus partes.

show abstract

Section: Nociones Generalesunclassified

“…No busca establecer qué cosas hay, es solamente una condición general que establece que, si ciertas cosas existen, hay un todo compuesto de esas cosas (cfr. Lando, 2017). Se sigue de esto que la composición siempre ocurre.…”

Section: Nociones Generalesunclassified

¿Es un todo prioritario a sus partes?

Briones

2023

Anál. Filos.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The author of this paper is convinced that indeed CEM is the general, exhaustive theory of parthood, and this motivates his attempt to ground the alleged thinness of mereological sums directly on (Unrestricted Composition) and (Extensionality of Proper Parts), given the other aspects of Linnebo's methodologyand in particular given the thesis that the availability of explanatory conditions of existence and criteria of identity is enough to legitimise reference to some entities and therefore their thin existence. Despite the contemporary lack of consensus about the status of CEM, there are still some defenders of what Fine (1994, p. 138) has polemically called "mereological monism," that is, the thesis that there is a single true and general theory of parthood and composition and that CEM is this theory (I have extensively tried to defend mereological monism, with some caveats, in Lando (2017)). In this paper, I do not argue in favour of mereological monism; I am only maintaining that CEM is sufficient to provide explanatory conditions of existence and criteria of identity for mereological sums without any need to resort to those troublesome abstraction principles for mereological sums at which Linnebo hints in his book.…”

Section: Thin Sums Without Abstractionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities

Lando

2022

Theoria

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to nonmathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstraction and interpretational modalities to mereological sums. In particular, I show that on one hand some prima facie attractive candidates for the role of an explanatory plural abstraction principle for mereological sums (in terms of pluralities of summed entities) are not really explanatory; on the other hand, singular abstraction principles (in terms of single summed entities) are materially inadequate. Nonetheless, explanatory criteria of identity and conditions of existence for mereological sums are provided by classical extensional mereology independent of abstraction principles. Thus, given classical extensional mereology, the reasons why, according to Linnebo, mathematical abstracted entities are thin also hold for mereological sums. Finally, I contend that interpretational modalities can be used to characterise the process by which a subject adds sums of previously admitted entities to the domain of quantification.

show abstract

“…In other words, the book provides a formal introduction to the topics and is rather shy on conceptual or intuitive perspectives. (For an easier ride into topology, see, for example, the work of Earl ( 2019) and the philosophy of mereology by Lando (2017).) Skowron is well aware of this, however, and from time to time, he shows a lighter side (Socrates' sting).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction to topo-philosophy

Krzanowski

2023

ZFN

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In philosophy, it is always refreshing to introduce unconventional ideas. It requires a certain audacity from the author; he or she may face the wall of silence or be shunned by academia, both treatments being undesirable. However, these are more rewarding than gathering laurels for beating the dead philosophical cats like Humes, Leibnitzs, Wittgensteins, Whiteheads, and others, a practice that for many philosophers is their life's opus. Bartłomiej Skowron’s book Part and Whole: Towards Topo-Ontology, published by Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej in 2021, certainly does not fall into this category. Skowron undertakes a discovery trip into an unknown land in his book, exploring new philosophical territories.

show abstract

Mereology

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

¿Es un todo prioritario a sus partes?

¿Es un todo prioritario a sus partes?

Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities

Introduction to topo-philosophy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About