Merger Remedies in the European Union: An Overview

Motta, Massimo; Polo, Michele; Vasconcelos, Hélder

doi:10.1177/0003603x0705200310

Cited by 33 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…The legislator has delegated merger control to the agency without taking care of the fact the agency must bear information costs to make optimal For example, the remedy must be easily applicable and a divestiture only quali…es as a potential remedy if it is a "viable business"which can "operate on a stand-alone basis" (EU, 2008). Thus, wider packages may be required in order to satisfy viability (Motta et al, 2003;Davies and Lyons, 2008). In case of behavioral remedies, standard obligations in vertical mergers not to foreclose outsiders and to supply them at a reasonable price quite naturally single out a remedy for a merger proposal (for instances see Paas, 2008, or de Valois Turk, 2012.…”

Section: A2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…21 First, we consider the case of a structural remedy in case of a horizontal merger. Structural remedies are used to restore e¤ective competition when the merging parties have considerable market power (Heyer, 2012;Motta et al, 2003;. Second, we analyze a vertical merger scenario in which a behavioral remedy can be applied to prevent foreclosure.…”

Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…21 Motta et al (2003) yield a precise distinction between structural and behavioral remedies via property rights: a structural remedy means a change in property rights of the divested business, whereas a behavioral remedy does not change any property rights.…”

Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Especially for vertical mergers, behavioral remedies are increasingly applied (Motta et al, 2003). Mostly, the agency does not face the choice between a structural or a behavioral remedy, but decides to implement the second if structural remedies are not available (Heyer, 2012).…”

Section: Vertical Mergersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Foreclosure is a prevalent objection against vertical mergers (Heyer, 2012;Motta et al, 2003). To countervail this, merged parties may be obliged not to foreclose outsiders, for to continue to supply them.…”

Section: Vertical Mergersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Dertwinkel-Kalt

Wey

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate how remedies in merger control a¤ect information acquisition by an antitrust agency. We identify conditions under which an "extreme options" regime which does not allow for remedies improves information acquisition by the agency which increases consumer surplus. The legislator ("principal") and the agency share the same objective function with the only exception that the latter must bear information costs. When remedies are not feasible, then the agency's incentive to acquire information is relatively large as a false decision tends to have large adverse e¤ects. When remedies are feasible, the intermediate option does not involve such risks, so that incentives to acquire information decreases. However, our results depend crucially on the institutional environment. In the case of an adversial system, information acquisition incentives are not per se lower if remedies are feasible.We thank Lars Sorgard and Deszö Szalay for their helpful comments.

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Section: A2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vertical Mergersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vertical Mergersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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