Merleau-Ponty, World-Creating Blindness, and the Phenomenology of Non-Normate Bodies

Reynolds, Joel Michael

doi:10.5840/chiasmi20171934

Cited by 34 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Though this example is certainly open to criticism, like that of (Reynolds, 2017) 2 I will not address the acknowledged differences or incompatibilities between actor-network theory and postphenomenology. For work on this topic, see (Langsdorf, 2015;Kroes and Verbeek, 2014;Verbeek, 2009) 3 The others are hermeneutic relations (with technologies like wristwatches, that feature a readout or display that, when interpreted, gives a transformed relation with the world); and alterity relations (with, e.g.,…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsafe Ground

Mitchell¹

2021

KKF

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This paper discusses how everyday technologies contribute to the enaction of disability, in particular by continually frustrating the formation of a general sense of ease in the world. It suggests that bodies have a fundamental relationality, within which technology comprises a central aspect; and that the very entity called the human is constituted through relationships with technologies. Then, it considers two ways that the organisation of technology is involved in the realisation of both ability and disability. First, it describes how the distribution of technological resources for activity are centred around bodies that are attributed normality and correctness, which also de-centres bodies falling outside this category: the former are enabled to act while the latter are not. Second, it proposes that ability and disability also involve habit: activities that have not only been repeated until familiar, but in which body and technologies can be forgotten. That typical bodies are centred allows them to develop robust habitual relationships with technological environments in which body and technologies can recede from attention, and crucially, to acquire a sense that their engagements will generally be supported. Atypical bodies, as de-centred, lack this secure ground: they cannot forget their relations with environments, and cannot simply assume that these will support their activity. This erodes bodily confi dence in a world that will support the projects, whether ordinary or innovative, that constitute a life.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsafe Ground

Mitchell¹

2021

KKF

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“…This tendency to privilege the body as a tacitly stable foundation for subjective experience has been evident in the method's treatment of memory (Trigg 2012) and bodily agency (Trigg 2014), together with an overarching commitment to the sense of the body as "one's own" (Trigg 2019). In each case, largely until the advent of critical phenomenology, phenomenology had tended to overlook the heterogeneity of specific articulations of bodily life, whether they be affective moods, physical disorders, or specific events of suffering such as solitary confinement (Guenther 2013;Reynolds 2017). The inclusion of the variations of bodily existence is especially a necessity in the case of "global" events such as COVID-19.…”

Section: The Body As Thingmentioning

confidence: 99%

COVID-19 and the Anxious Body

Trigg

2022

pjcp

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This article reflects on the way COVID-19 has altered our understanding and experience of everyday life, with a particular focus on the relationship between anxiety and the body. There are a number of ways to think about how anxiety has impacted bodily experience during the pandemic, and I focus on two specific aspects. First, I focus on the transformation of the body from a site of pre-reflective unity to its thematization as a discernible thing. In the process, I argue that this disclosure of the body as a thing renders the body an object of anxiety while also being an expression of anxiety. Second, I consider the role anxiety plays in altering our relationship to other people. Instead of a fluid interplay between oneself and another, I argue that the pandemic has shifted our relationship to other people through concealing the expressivity of the body. I conclude by considering how these aspects can challenge conventional ideas of phenomenology while also underscoring the necessity of a critical approach.

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“…It needn't be reduced to an atomistic rationalism that would exclude those who do not match a single form of consciousness and bodily development (Martiny 2015). Merleau-Pontian phenomenology can also be used to show the shared, bodily in-dwelling that bridges the divide between bodies deemed "abled" and "disabled," and those shifting in-between (Reynolds 2017). Finally, as I have argued in a short book, Heideggerian phenomenology can be used to explore the space of collective meaning upstream from the spaces of subjectivity (Abrams 2016).…”

Section: Social and Collectivementioning

confidence: 99%