Metalinguistic proposals

Hansen, Nat

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1658628

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…One approach would be to remain strictly committed to the merely descriptive claim that the intuitive truth values vary across the two contexts. Of course, this would still be subject to confirmation via observation of our intuitive truth values, and this is something that has already occurred to some extent in the experimental literature (Hansen andChemla 2013, Grindrod, Andow, andHansen 2018). In this paper, I will adopt a slightly stronger claim: that not only does it appear that there is a variation in communicated content across the two cases, but that there really is a variation in communicated content.…”

Section: Contextual Variabilitymentioning

confidence: 83%

“…One initial approach would be to draw on some of the recent work that has been done on conceptual engineering in order to capture John's behaviour as a case of inappropriate conceptual engineering. Hansen (2019) distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful metalinguistic proposals – attempts to get speakers to adopt a proposed use. One way to be successful with a metalinguistic proposal is to hold the appropriate kind of linguistic authority.…”

Section: Wrongful Standard-raisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

Grindrod

2020

Episteme

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This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section argues that the possibility the epistemic standard could be raised in some epistemic inappropriate way warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier attempts to raise the epistemic standard in order to shut down inquiry.

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Section: Contextual Variabilitymentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Wrongful Standard-raisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

Grindrod

2020

Episteme

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“…Alternatively, Ilana may be better understood as proposing an understanding of a concept—or even more specifically engaging in what Nat Hansen has recently called a “metalinguistic proposal”: “speech acts that involve an intention for an audience to come to have a reason to use or understand the use of a linguistic expression in a particular way” (2019, 1). Or consider another account: Ilana stipulates that the concept in question should be understood in a certain way (Shields 2020, 2021).…”

Section: Suppositions Metalinguistic Proposals and Stipulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual Change and Future Paths for Pragmatism

Shields¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The pragmatist faces the challenge of accounting for the possibility of rational conceptual change. Some pragmatists have tried to meet this challenge by appealing to Neurathian imagery-imagery that risks being too figurative to be helpful. I argue that we can develop a clearer view of what rationally constrained conceptual revision looks like for the pragmatist. I do so by examining the work of the pragmatist who in recent years has addressed this issue most directly, Richard Rorty. His attempts to solve the puzzle ultimately fall short, but prove instructive. Rorty characterizes inter-language transitions in exclusively causal terms because, along with the very philosophical traditions he criticizes, he uncritically privileges the role of truth claims or assertions in our pragmatics. I show that if we instead broaden our pragmatic imaginations, we encounter various non-assertoric speech acts involved in speakers aiming to change how we make sense of our language and concepts. With these acts in view, we are able to arrive at a demystified view of rational conceptual change from a pragmatist perspective and identify future lines of inquiry for pragmatist projects.

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“…Speakers also sometimes advocate for conceptual or interpretive choices even when they know they are unlikely to convince their interlocutors to adopt them. This is discussed byHansen (2021) under the label of "metalinguistic provocations".…”

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confidence: 99%

Contested metalinguistic negotiation

Rudolph

2023

Synthese

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In ordinary conversation, speakers disagree not only about worldly facts, but also about how to use language to describe the world. For example, disagreement about whether Buffalo is in the American Midwest, whether Pluto is a planet, or whether someone has been canceled, can persist even with agreement about all the relevant facts. The speakers may still engage in "metalinguistic negotiation" -disputing what to mean by "Midwest", "planet", or "cancel". I first motivate an approach to metalinguistic negotiation that generalizes a Stalnakerian theory of communication by including linguistic commitments in the conversational common ground. Then, I turn to cases where the very status of a disagreement as metalinguistic or factual is unclear or contested. For example, after the publication of the New York Times Magazine's 1619 Project, some responses claimed to identify factual errors, while others took those same "errors" to be matters of interpretation. I'll consider how to extend our theorizing about metalinguistic negotiation to this type of (even more) "meta" disagreement, using the discussion following the 1619 Project as a case study. On my view, in most such cases, there will be a metalinguistic negotiation going on. Still, I explain several ways in which, despite a dispute being metalinguistic, the factualist side can sometimes receive important vindication. I also discuss why it can make sense for speakers to contest the status of a dispute.

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Metalinguistic proposals

Cited by 13 publications

References 38 publications

Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

Conceptual Change and Future Paths for Pragmatism

Contested metalinguistic negotiation

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