Metamemory Experiments in Neurological Populations: A Review

Pannu, Jasmeet K.; Kaszniak, Alfred W.

doi:10.1007/s11065-005-7091-6

Cited by 198 publications

(186 citation statements)

References 121 publications

(159 reference statements)

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“…This finding bolsters previous evidence for the notion that metacognitive skill in one domain may not necessarily translate to another (David et al, 2012;Metcalfe et al, 2012;Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005;Schnyer et al, 2004). Furthermore, our results indicate that metacognitive accuracy in each domain was related to regional differences of white matter microstructure.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Baird

Cieslak

Smallwood

et al. 2015

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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Abstract■ The neural mechanisms that mediate metacognitive ability (the capacity to accurately reflect on oneʼs own cognition and experience) remain poorly understood. An important question is whether metacognitive capacity is a domain-general skill supported by a core neuroanatomical substrate or whether regionally specific neural structures underlie accurate reflection in different cognitive domains. Providing preliminary support for the latter possibility, recent findings have shown that individual differences in metacognitive ability in the domains of memory and perception are related to variation in distinct gray matter volume and resting-state functional connectivity. The current investigation sought to build on these findings by evaluating how metacognitive ability in these domains is related to variation in white matter microstructure. We quantified metacognitive ability across memory and perception domains and used diffusion spectrum imaging to examine the relation between high-resolution measurements of white matter microstructure and individual differences in metacognitive accuracy in each domain. We found that metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions and memory were uncorrelated across individuals and that metacognitive accuracy in each domain was related to variation in white matter microstructure in distinct brain areas. Metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in white matter underlying the ACC, whereas metacognitive accuracy for memory retrieval was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in the white matter extending into the inferior parietal lobule. Together, these results extend previous findings linking metacognitive ability in the domains of perception and memory to variation in distinct brain structures and connections. ■

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Baird

Cieslak

Smallwood

et al. 2015

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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“…These feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments can refer to a primary cognition in the future or in the past. That is, people can have different degrees of confidence that they will be able to remember some memory at a later time, and people can have retrospective confidence judgments about a memory that has already been retrieved (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). In other words, the primary cognition in FOK judgments is thought of as the prediction of future retrieval ability whereas the primary cognition in retrospective confidence judgments is a memory report that has already been made.…”

Section: Metacognitive Confidence In Memory Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognitive confidence: A neuroscience approach

Luttrell

Briñol

Petty

et al. 2013

Revista de Psicología Social

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El acceso a la versión del editor puede requerir la suscripción del recurso Access to the published version may require subscription Metacognition refers to thoughts about our own thoughts or thought processes and implies a distinction between primary and secondary cognition (Dulonsky & Metcalfe, 2009). Primary thoughts are those that occur at a direct level of cognition and involve our initial associations of an object with some attribute, such as "I choose that product" or "I would like to sit down here with you." These primary cognitions are also called "object level" thoughts (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990). Following a primary thought, people can also generate other thoughts that occur at a second level. These thoughts involve reflections on the first level thoughts (e.g., "Do I really want to make that choice?" or "I am not so sure how much I would like to sit down here.").Among other things, secondary thoughts are important because they can magnify, attenuate, or even reverse the impact of first order cognitions. As noted recently by Briñol and DeMarree (2012), metacognition has assumed a prominent role in understanding social evaluations, decisions, as well as identity, and interpersonal interactions. In the present article, we review some of the work relevant for understanding how metacognition operates in the brain.There are several dimensions on which metacognitions can vary. For example, Petty, Briñol, Tormala, and Wegener (2007) suggested that people can think about their thoughts in terms of a variety of dimensions such as valence, number, target, origin, evaluation, and confidence. For example, two individuals might have the same thought but one believes that the thought stemmed from their own brains whereas another believes the thought reflects someone else's views. In another classic taxonomy, Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009) classify metacognitions into three primary types: metacognitive knowledge (people's naïve theories about their thinking), monitoring (evaluating the appropriateness of one's own thoughts), and control (regulation on the thoughts). For example, students' perceptions that they "know" information for a test (over and above student's actual knowledge of the material) can regulate people's behavior (e.g., by discontinuing studying for a test on the target material; Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970).We begin this article by reviewing how neuroscience has dealt with the distinction between first and second-order cognition. Although we will refer to different types of metacognitions throughout, we will focus our attention on metacognitive confidence. Thus, the second part of the chapter describes the importance of considering metacognitive confidence because it affects whether people use their primary cognitions in guiding judgments and behaviors. The research described in that section is organized around the type of primary thoughts for which people have confidence, including judgments about memory, choices, and evaluative judgments. Primary vs. Secondary CognitionAs just noted, a numb...

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“…Meta-memory refers to an individual's knowledge and awareness of their memory capabilities, and the processes of memory self-monitoring (Nelson and Narens, 1990;Pannu and Kaszniak, 2005). While many measures of meta-memory have been developed (Pannu and Kaszniak, 2005), retrospective confidence ratings are most relevant in the context of false memories and delusions. Indeed, have argued that high confidence in false belief is a "defining feature of delusions" (p.185), and that the level of confidence one has in a (false) memory determines its impact on overt behaviour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

High estradiol levels improve false memory rates and meta-memory in highly schizotypal women

Hodgetts

Hausmann

Weis

2015

Psychiatry Research

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(2015) 'High estradiol levels improve false memory rates and meta-memory in highly schizotypal women.', Psychiatry research., 229 (3). pp. 708-714. Further information on publisher's website:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres. 2015.08.016 Publisher's copyright statement: NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Psychiatry Research. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be re ected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractOverconfidence in false memories is often found in patients with schizophrenia and healthy participants with high levels of schizotypy, indicating an impairment of meta-cognition within the memory domain. In general, cognitive control is suggested to be modulated by natural fluctuations in estrogen. However, whether estrogen exerts beneficial effects on metamemory has not yet been investigated. The present study sought to provide evidence that high levels of schizotypy are associated with increased false memory rates and overconfidence in false memories, and that these processes may be modulated by natural differences in estradiol levels. Using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, it was found that highly schizotypal participants with high estradiol produced significantly fewer false memories than those with low estradiol. No such difference was found within the low schizotypy participants. Highly schizotypal participants with high estradiol were also less confident in their false memories than those with low estradiol; low schizotypy participants with high estradiol were more confident. However, these differences only approached significance. These findings suggest that the beneficial effect of estradiol on memory and meta-memory observed in healthy participants is specific to highly schizotypal individuals and might be related to individual differences in baseline dopaminergic activity.

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Metamemory Experiments in Neurological Populations: A Review

Cited by 198 publications

References 121 publications

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Metacognitive confidence: A neuroscience approach

High estradiol levels improve false memory rates and meta-memory in highly schizotypal women

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