Metaphor, hyperbole and simile: A pragmatic approach

Abstract

According to recent work on lexical pragmatics within the relevance-theoretic framework, grasping the intended meaning of a metaphorically used word requires a process of adjusting the linguistically encoded concept to derive an ad hoc concept whose denotation is broader than that of the lexical concept. Metaphorical uses are claimed to be one kind of loose use of language, on a continuum with approximations, hyperboles and other kinds of meaning extension. The question addressed in this paper is whether this account fully captures the processes involved in understanding metaphors and the kinds of cognitive effects they have. We tackle this question by examining the similarities and differences between metaphors and hyperboles and between metaphors and similes. The upshot of our analyses is two proposals, both requiring further investigation: (a) that a distinction should be drawn between the kind of ad hoc concepts derived for hyperbolic and other loose uses, on the one hand, and metaphorical uses, on the other, and (b) that the understanding of some metaphorical uses, in particular extended and/or novel creative cases, is achieved by a different mode of processing altogether, one which gives much greater weight to the literal meaning.

Metaphor and Hyperbole: Testing the Continuity Hypothesis

“…In our view, a close inspection of clear examples shows that while hyperboles involve only a change in magnitude between the concept encoded and the concept expressed, metaphors involve a qualitative change, resulting in a difference in kind (Carston and Wearing 2011). As we see it, hyperbolic uses of language are straightforward loose uses: one of the essential (perhaps defining) features of the lexically encoded meaning consists of a point or interval on a scalar dimension and this point or interval clearly outstrips the reality described, so must be relaxed or broadened.…”

A Relevance-theoretic Perspective on Metonymy

“…No logical or contextual implications are shared between the communicated concepts, 'piano player' in (16) and 'the President of the White House' in (17), and the one encoded by the utterances, the piano and the White House, respectively. Thus, they do not constitute cases of narrowing or broadening of the encoded concept (Carston, 2010(Carston, , 2011Wilson & Carston, 2007). Rather, they involve a transfer of reference (Jiang, 2013;Nunberg, 1979) or the novel fixation of reference for an existing expression (Papafragou, 1996), as they refer to objects which lie outside their linguistically-specified denotation.…”

<i>Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston’s Pragmatics</i>

“…This is supported by the fact that the fundamental difference between simile and metaphor is that lexically encoded concepts occur in the explicature of simile and an ad hoc concepts are concerned in metaphor. (Carston and Wearing (2011)) Thus, phrasal ad hoc concepts are untenable from this standpoint.…”

“…He is the poet Ausonius. And as Carston and Wearing (2011) correctly point out, most similes which use verbs other than "be" do not have metaphor counterparts, and vice versa.…”