Metaphysical Presuppositions of Scientific Practice: ‘Atomism’ vs. ‘Wholism’

Abstract

A certain order or stability of nature has often been seen as a necessary presupposition of many of our scientific practices, in particular of our use of information gained in one kind of circumstance to explain or predict what happens in quite different situations. John Maynard Keynes and, more recently, Nancy Cartwright have argued that these practices commit us to the existence of stable ‘atoms’ or ‘natures’ or ‘tendencies.’ The phenomena we observe in nature are, on this view, the result of superimposing the invariable, context-independent effects of all the different tendencies involved.

Transcendental realisms in the philosophy of science: on Bhaskar and Cartwright

“…However,Rueger & Sharp (1998) argue that veridical nomic explanatory exportation is still possible given a modest wholism.…”