Some of the fundamental lessons of the so-called revolution against descriptivism that occurred in the 70s are negative and it is not immediately apparent what kind of semantic theory should emerge as regards proper names, the alleged paradigms of genuinely referential terms. Some of the claims about names, most notably Ruth Barcan Marcus' characterization of names as tags, appear to be too picturesque to provide the basis for a positive theory and, without a theory, it would seem that the referential link between name and bearer is established by pure magic. Some authors have appealed to the causal-historical picture to construct a positive theory, and have endorsed causal descriptivism, a variety of descriptivism that incorporates causal factors. I argue against causal descriptivism and I assess the demand for a positive semantic theory of names.1.-Names. The search for a semantic theory.In the early seventies several philosophers of language argued for a radical change of perspective in the conception of reference. Much of the discussion among the early champions of the radical change, most notably Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan and Ruth Barcan Marcus, focused on proper names, the paradigmatic kind of expression that we use in order to say things about individuals. 1The emerging approach is known variously as Direct Reference Theory, Millianism, and Causal o Causal-Historical Theory, and it is also called by some -still now, over forty years down the road-the 'new' theory of reference.