Methodology for Ranking the Elements of Water-Supply Networks

Michaud, David; Apostolakis, G.

doi:10.1061/(asce)1076-0342(2006)12:4(230)

Cited by 79 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Proces analizy ryzyka na potrzeby bezpieczeństwa funkcjonowania SZZW przebiega w następujących fazach rozpoznawczych [4,9]: określenie liczby mieszkańców korzystających z SZZW, wyznaczenie reprezentatywnych zdarzeń awaryjnych i określenie dla nich scenariuszy rozwoju w celu oszacowania strat, określenie prawdopodobieństwa (częstotliwości) występowania zdarzeń niepożądanych, określenie stopnia podatności na zdarzenia niepożądane konsumentów wody, przeprowadzenie analizy systemu zabezpieczeń w SZZW, w tym systemu monitoringu i zdalnego sterowania oraz tzw. barier ochronnych wchodzących w skład SZZW, np.…”

Section: Ryzyko Jako Miara Bezpieczeństwa Systemów Zbiorowego Zaopatrunclassified

Exploitation of the CWSS in the Aspect of Belonging to the Critical Infrastructure / Eksploatacja Szzw W Aspekcie Przynależności Do Infrastruktury Krytycznej

Tchórzewska-Cieślak¹,

Pietrucha-Urbanik²

2013

Journal of KONBiN

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Section: Ryzyko Jako Miara Bezpieczeństwa Systemów Zbiorowego Zaopatrunclassified

Exploitation of the CWSS in the Aspect of Belonging to the Critical Infrastructure / Eksploatacja Szzw W Aspekcie Przynależności Do Infrastruktury Krytycznej

Tchórzewska-Cieślak¹,

Pietrucha-Urbanik²

2013

Journal of KONBiN

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“…Patterson and Apostolakis (2007) introduce importance measures for ranking the system elements in complex systems exposed to terrorist actions. Michaud and Apostolakis (2006) analyze such measures of damage caused by the terror and its impact on people, the environment, public image, etc. Dighe et al (2009) consider secrecy in defensive allocations as a strategy for achieving more cost-effective terrorist deterrence.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game

Hausken

Zhuang

2011

Decision Analysis

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W e analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist's resources and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking a government's asset and defending its own resources. A two-stage game is considered where the government moves first and the terrorist moves second. We show that (a) when the terrorist's resources are low, the government attacks the terrorist's resources sufficiently to deter the terrorist from attacking and does not defend; (b) when the terrorist's resources are high, both the government and terrorist defend and attack. We analyze T periods of the two-stage game between two myopic players. First we assume no linkages between periods. We show that after an attack the government may enjoy incoming resources, which deter the terrorist for some periods. Between periods the terrorist's resources may change because of arithmetically and geometrically changing incoming funds. We allow the government's and the terrorist's resources to be determined randomly in each time period. We also allow the government's resources in one period to depend on the terrorist's attacks in earlier time periods for three dynamics, where the terrorist's resources are drawn from a normal distribution or change arithmetically or geometrically.

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“…Patterson and Apostolakis [2007] introduced importance measures for ranking the system elements in complex systems exposed to terrorist actions. Michaud and Apostolakis [2006] analyzed such measures of damage caused by the terror as impact on people, impact on environment, impact on public image etc. Bier et al [2006] assume that a defender allocates defense to a collection of locations while an attacker chooses a location to attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Active vs. Passive Defense Against a Strategic Attacker

Hausken

Levitin

2011

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the preventive strike. The defender makes its decision about striking preventively based on its estimate of the probability of being attacked. In both cases of preventive strike and no preventive strike, the defender anticipates the most harmful attacker's strategy. The influence of the ratio between the player's resources and the contest intensities on the solution of the game is analyzed.

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Methodology for Ranking the Elements of Water-Supply Networks

Cited by 79 publications

References 14 publications

Exploitation of the CWSS in the Aspect of Belonging to the Critical Infrastructure / Eksploatacja Szzw W Aspekcie Przynależności Do Infrastruktury Krytycznej

Exploitation of the CWSS in the Aspect of Belonging to the Critical Infrastructure / Eksploatacja Szzw W Aspekcie Przynależności Do Infrastruktury Krytycznej

Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game

Active vs. Passive Defense Against a Strategic Attacker

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