#MeToo &amp; the role of Outright Belief

Lloyd, Alexandra

doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10276-x

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Notice also that McGrath tends to gloss "being agnostic" as having middling credences, so I can simply run with his account here. (See, e.g., Nelson (2010) for the position that we don't have positive epistemic duties, and see, e.g., Ichikawa (2022), Lloyd (2022), and Simion (2023) for the opposite view) Thus, there seems to be a fundamental tension between our intuitions: in cases like Detective Tupper's, we don't want to say that the agent's belief is justified because they don't appreciate that it is defeated. But in cases like Detective Fletcher's, it seems natural to say that their agnostic attitude is justified if they don't yet appreciate what their evidence supports.…”

Section: A Problem Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Suspension in Inquiry

Staffel

2024

Episteme

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When we're inquiring to find out whether p is true, knowing that we'll get better evidence in the future seems like a good reason to suspend judgment about p now. But, as Matt McGrath has recently argued, this natural thought is in deep tension with traditional accounts of justification. On traditional views of justification, which doxastic attitude you are justified in having now depends on your current evidence, not on what you might learn later. McGrath proposes to resolve this tension by distinguishing between different ways of having a neutral attitude. I argue that McGrath's account is unable to account for the full range of cases in which an agnostic attitude is warranted. We can remedy this by pairing his account with my theory of transitional and terminal attitudes, which claims that attitudes are justified in different ways depending on whether they are formed in intermediate stages of deliberation or as conclusions of deliberation. I compare my view with an alternative, more parsimonious one, according to which deliberation itself is a source of new evidence. I argue that this alternative proposal is faced with a dilemma: it either generates a vicious regress, or it fails to capture the relevant cases.

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Section: A Problem Casementioning

confidence: 99%