Microfibrous metallic cloth for acoustic isolation of a MEMS gyroscope

Dean, Robert N.; Burch, Nesha; Black, Meagan; Beal, Aubrey N.; Flowers, George T.

doi:10.1117/12.880624

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…To do it, special sound screens should be implemented to protect against acoustic effects, or special absorbing materials should be used in packaging [42]. An alter native method proposes increasing the ES natural fre quency above the acoustic frequency, which reduces the gyro sensitivity to the angular rate.…”

Section: Design and Structural Methods To Improve Shock And Vibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing the mechanical resistance of micromechanical gyros

Evstifeev

Eliseev

Chelpanov³

2015

Gyroscopy Navig.

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Section: Design and Structural Methods To Improve Shock And Vibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing the mechanical resistance of micromechanical gyros

Evstifeev

Eliseev

Chelpanov³

2015

Gyroscopy Navig.

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“…To protect MEMS inertial sensors without compromising their advantages in size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C [48]), recent studies have been dedicated to using micro-level techniques for acoustic isolation. Dean et al proposed the use of microfibrous metallic cloth as an acoustic damping material to protect MEMS gyroscopes [43]. Soobramaney et al evaluated the mitigation effects of microfibrous cloth on noise signals induced in MEMS gyros under acoustic interferences [65].…”

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors

Tu,

Lin,

Lee

et al. 2018

Preprint

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Inertial sensors provide crucial feedback for control systems to determine motional status and make timely, automated decisions. Prior efforts tried to control the output of inertial sensors with acoustic signals. However, their approaches did not consider sample rate drifts in analogto-digital converters as well as many other realistic factors. As a result, few attacks demonstrated effective control over inertial sensors embedded in real systems.This work studies the out-of-band signal injection methods to deliver adversarial control to embedded MEMS inertial sensors and evaluates consequent vulnerabilities exposed in control systems relying on them. Acoustic signals injected into inertial sensors are out-ofband analog signals. Consequently, slight sample rate drifts could be amplified and cause deviations in the frequency of digital signals. Such deviations result in fluctuating sensor output; nevertheless, we characterize two methods to control the output: digital amplitude adjusting and phase pacing. Based on our analysis, we devise non-invasive attacks to manipulate the sensor output as well as the derived inertial information to deceive control systems. We test 25 devices equipped with MEMS inertial sensors and find that 17 of them could be implicitly controlled by our attacks. Furthermore, we investigate the generalizability of our methods and show the possibility to manipulate the digital output through signals with relatively low frequencies in the sensing channel.

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