2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.06.003
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Microfinance spillovers: A model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to Indian villages

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Cited by 21 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…However, we have not accounted for informal village money lenders, partly because such data is lacking for our period. A recent literature studies the impact of competition between MFIs and money lenders on market outcomes, including interest rates (Mookherjee and Motta, 2016;Demont, 2016). It would be interesting to extend our results in this dimension and examine how the entry decisions of MFIs depends on existing informal money lending.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…However, we have not accounted for informal village money lenders, partly because such data is lacking for our period. A recent literature studies the impact of competition between MFIs and money lenders on market outcomes, including interest rates (Mookherjee and Motta, 2016;Demont, 2016). It would be interesting to extend our results in this dimension and examine how the entry decisions of MFIs depends on existing informal money lending.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…En el nivel bajo de ingresos de las firmas, el problema es el escaso acceso a servicios financieros dado su tamaño muy pequeño, a medida que ese tamaño se expande el acceso a financiamiento, por ejemplo, es informal y en menor medida formal, lo que captura esa curva primero decreciente de inclusión financiera, en línea con lo postulado por Demont (2016).…”
Section: Resultsunclassified
“…One of the major challenges faced especially by personal loan programs of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), is that borrowers are highly risky since they are typically low net-worth individuals with little or no collateral that can be acquired by the MFI in the event of default (Kodongo & Kendi, 2013). A popular remedy to this problem involves requiring borrowers to apply for credit in voluntarily formed groups: since such borrowers know each other, safe borrowers will likely form their own groups, avoiding those with higher risk profiles this mitigates the adverse selection problem (Demont, 2013). Group lending model has attracted an enormous amount of public and academic attention mainly after the success of group lending program in Grameenq Bank (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%