Middlemen as guarantors of quality

Biglaiser, Gary; Friedman, James W.

doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90005-1

Cited by 144 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Celui-ci est un expert qui limite en particulier les risques de hasard moral liés à une transaction Biglaiser et Friedman, 1993). Li (1998) ajoute que l'on devient intermédiaire par acquisition d'expertise, indiquant par là-même que c'est l'expertise de l'intermédiaire qui fait la valeur de l'intermédiation.…”

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Création de valeur par les intermédiaires du tourisme : quel cadre d’analyse?

Clergeau¹,

Marghobi²

2016

tourisme

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Création de valeur par les intermédiaires du tourisme : quel cadre d’analyse?

Clergeau¹,

Marghobi²

2016

tourisme

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“…Therefore, by assumption, we exclude the role of intermediaries as agents who can become 'experts' as in Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994). Likewise, we rule out investigating the intermediaries' incentives to reveal and certify quality as in Lizzieri (1999) or Pßeider (1986, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Externalities among Hotel Establishments: What is the Impact of Tour Operators?

Calveras

Vera‐Hernández

2005

Tourism Economics

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This paper is about quality decisions in a vertical structure where competitive producers sell to 'powerful retailers'. SpeciÞcally, we focus the analysis on the role played by a tour operator (TO) on quality investments when distributing the capacity of a given tourist destination. We emphasize the presence of quality externalities among hotel establishments, and see that sometimes a TO distribution can provide a solution to the 'tragedy of the commons' in quality provision. Thus, we analyze what implications do vertical relations have for quality in this industry, and then derive some policy recommendations.We thank Carmen Matutes for her most valuable contribution to the initial development of this work. Of course, any possible errors are the authors' sole responsability.

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“…Garella (1989) and Biglaiser (1993) investigate the role played by middlemen in markets characterized by "lemon problems" and adverse selection. Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) model the role of a middleman as alleviating producers' moral hazard problem by reducing the sales of products that are found to be of a lower quality than what producers claim them to be. Hackett (1992Hackett ( , 1993 compares the incentives to invest in sales promotion between two types of agents: a dealer and a consignment contracted agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real Estate Brokers and Commission: Theory and Calibrations

Shy

2010

J Real Estate Finan Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The author constructs a theoretical model to examine the effects of an inherent conflict of interest between a seller of a house and the real estate broker hired by the seller. The model is then used to calibrate the broker's commission rates that would maximize the seller's expected gain. The findings suggest that while the pressure brokers exert on sellers to reduce prices generates faster sales and hence improves social welfare, the usual commission rate of 6 percent exceeds the seller's value-maximizing rate if the sale is handled by a single agent. On the other hand, if several agents (such as the buyer's and seller's brokers and the agencies that employ these realtors) split the commission, then a 6 percent commission rate may be required to motivate the broker to sell at a high price. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

show abstract

Middlemen as guarantors of quality

Cited by 144 publications

References 13 publications

Création de valeur par les intermédiaires du tourisme : quel cadre d’analyse?

Création de valeur par les intermédiaires du tourisme : quel cadre d’analyse?

Quality Externalities among Hotel Establishments: What is the Impact of Tour Operators?

Real Estate Brokers and Commission: Theory and Calibrations

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