Migrant protection regimes: Beyond advocacy and towards exit in Thailand

Abstract

International migrants are subject to many types of violence, such as trafficking, detention, and forced labour. We need an improved understanding of what protects migrants from such violence. The concept of ‘migrant protection regimes’ draws our attention away from formal rights advocacy and to both the informal dimensions of protection and the way migrants help determine the quality of protection they receive. ‘Migrant protection regimes’ are sets of rules and practices regarding who ought to protect whom. These regimes include formal rights to protection in the law and informal relationships that protect migrants from lawful violence by the state. They may be changed by ‘power grabs’, when sovereign actors seek to monopolise protection relationships, but also by ‘exits’, when migrants refuse to accept the protection on offer. The study demonstrates the value of these concepts by using them to explain an unlikely case: a change in laws concerning migrant protection in an authoritarian state: Thailand. Drawing on rich qualitative sources, the article reveals how, after a human rights advocacy campaign had placed migrants’ protection in jeopardy, a mass migrant exodus compelled the country's junta to offer migrants protection on better terms.

Working for a better future: exploring how network capital fosters Laotian migrant workers in Thai family SMEs

“…Firstly, we theorised that chain networks are associated with decision-making, attention and the ability of independent mobility in Thai family SMEs. The results are in line with prior studies indicating that chain networks are linked to the workplace, destination and transnational networks (Prasad et al , 2022; Sakulsri, 2020; Siriphon and Li, 2022; Statham et al , 2020; Tsolakis et al , 2021; Vigneswaran, 2020). Some scholars have contributed that chain networks are related to self-networks and broker networks in home-sending to labour-receiving countries (Baù et al , 2021; Clark and Longo, 2022; Krifors, 2021; Li and Johansen, 2023).…”

“…The research question proposed in this research is: “How does network capital foster Laotian migrant workers in Thai SMEs?” The results showed that network capital is associated with chain, social, human and financial networks. The findings have filled the theoretical gaps in network capital research (Bhula-or, 2021; Daovisan et al , 2022; Statham et al , 2020; Suhardiman et al , 2021; Vigneswaran, 2020). This research is one of the few studies in existing literature on self-network and agent network capital between home-sending and host-receiving countries (Das et al , 2020; Koltai et al , 2020; Orsini and Magnier-Watanabe, 2023).…”

“…The results showed that network capital is associated with chain, social, human and financial networks. The findings have filled the theoretical gaps in network capital research (Bhula-or, 2021;Daovisan et al, 2022;Statham et al, 2020;Suhardiman et al, 2021;Vigneswaran, 2020). This research is one of the few studies in existing…”

“…To address the aforementioned gaps in literature, the objective of this research is to explore how network capital fosters Laotian migrant workers in Thai family SMEs. This is distinctly patterned network capital in host-labour-receiving countries that has existed in literature (Moret, 2020; Pham et al , 2019; Schapendonk et al , 2020; Sunam et al , 2021; Tipayalai, 2020; Ullah et al , 2019; Vigneswaran, 2020). Firstly, this research provides new theoretical insights into the mechanisms underlying network capital – chain, social, human and financial networks (Christ, 2020; Clark and Lisowski, 2019; Hesketh and Box, 2020).…”

Hacking migration control: Repurposing and reprogramming deportability

“…Our findings suggest that migrants take these decisions in order to improve their lives and protect themselves from different forms of violence. While this way of practising security (Innes, 2014(Innes, , 2016) may be personally ill advised, it may also be cumulatively impactful: confounding the governing strategies of those who profit from the provision of protection or execution of violence -including political elites, ordinary officials, employers, smugglers and other private agents -and compelling those same actors to rethink and refine the methods they use to control migrant mobility and labour (Vigneswaran, 2020). For these reasons, we argue that migrants consistently 'hack' the condition of deportability: repurposing its illegal and legal forms towards their own ends.…”