Migrating SGX Enclaves with Persistent State

Alder, Fritz; Kurnikov, Arseny; Paverd, Andrew; Asokan, N.

doi:10.1109/dsn.2018.00031

Cited by 26 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Our implementation is based on the Open Enclave SDK [13] v0. 16.1, but could be applied to any other SGX SDK. We first describe the specific steps required for migrating an Intel SGX enclave ( §5.1) and then discuss how we integrated these into the CRIU [8] process migration tool ( §5.2).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fork and roll-back attacks. In addition to secure key transfer, the design must also ensure that the migration functionality itself cannot be used to mount attacks such as a fork or roll-back attack [16]. Specifically, we need a mechanism to ensure that the source TEE cannot continue running after the checkpoint operation has been completed, as this could lead to a fork attack with multiple copies of the same TEE running.…”

Section: Maintaining Tee Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There have been several proposals to retrofit migration functionality into existing in-process TEE architectures. Guerreiro et al [21] use Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to manage the cryptographic keys needed to securely migrate the data; Alder et al [16] describe how to migrate the persistent state (e.g., hardware-based monotonic counter values) that may be associated with a TEE. However, all of these require either changes to the hardware (which is likely to be impractical given the large deployed base), or they assume the TEE will reach a quiescent state before it is migrated, which limits the applicability of the technique.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

CTR: Checkpoint, Transfer, and Restore for Secure Enclaves

Nakatsuka¹,

Öztürk²,

Shamis³

et al. 2022

Preprint

Self Cite

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Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are becoming increasingly prevalent in cloud computing, forming the basis for confidential computing. However, the security goals of TEEs sometimes conflict with existing cloud functionality, such as VM or process migration, because TEE memory cannot be read by the hypervisor, OS, or other software on the platform. Whilst some newer TEE architectures support migration of entire protected VMs, there is currently no practical solution for migrating individual processes containing in-process TEEs. The inability to migrate such processes leads to operational inefficiencies or even data loss if the host platform must be urgently restarted.We present CTR, a software-only design to retrofit migration functionality into existing TEE architectures, whilst maintaining their expected security guarantees. Our design allows TEEs to be interrupted and migrated at arbitrary points in their execution, thus maintaining compatibility with existing VM and process migration techniques. By cooperatively involving the TEE in the migration process, our design also allows application developers to specify stateful migration-related policies, such as limiting the number of times a particular TEE may be migrated. Our prototype implementation for Intel SGX demonstrates that migration latency increases linearly with the size of the TEE memory and is dominated by TEE system operations.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Maintaining Tee Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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CTR: Checkpoint, Transfer, and Restore for Secure Enclaves

Nakatsuka¹,

Öztürk²,

Shamis³

et al. 2022

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…The key ability provided by Intel SGX is the notion of confidential, private execution with integrity guarantees. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of Intel SGX only includes hardware, thus avoiding the security vulnerabilities and threats of software-based TCB and greatly improving system security [40]. In addition, Intel SGX guarantees a trusted execution environment at runtime, making it impossible for malicious code to access and tamper with the protected content of other programs at runtime.…”

Section: B Tee With Intel Sgxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybridchain: A Novel Architecture for Confidentiality-Preserving and Performant Permissioned Blockchain Using Trusted Execution Environment

Wang

Zhao

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Blockchain is making headlines due to it promises to provide a decentralized, transparent, tamper-resistant, traceable and verifiable historical transaction records that can resist faults of any single node. According to the latest data from State of the Dapps, developers have currently released 3,717 Decentralized Applications (DApps), only three have an average of more than 10,000 daily active users. Most of the real-world DApps exercise little of their potential power. The key reason is that the current permissioned blockchain systems suffer from poor performance and lack of confidentiality. To address this issue, we present Hybridchain, a system that combines blockchain with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Hybridchain decouples computation from consensus and adopts hierarchical network to minimize the computational burden and latency of on-chain execution by performing most of the heavyweight computation off-chain. Hybridchain leverages secure communication protocols to enable each participant to share transaction data in a secure way. To mitigate the small enclave memory restriction of TEE, Hybridchain extends the enclave memory that allows blockchain applications running in TEE to securely store transaction records to the whole key-value storage codes placed outside of TEE. Analysis and experiments of sealed-bid auction show that Hybridchain can support confidentiality-preserving along with high performance.

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“…Gu et al proposed a software-based solution by augmenting enclaves with a thread that could run remote attestation to establish a secure channel with the thread within another identical enclave, and then perform state transfer [67]. Alder et al proposed an approach to migrate the persistent states of enclaves, e.g., sealed data, which is outside of the enclave memory [68]. And Soriente et al designed ReplicaTEE for seamless replication of enclaves in clouds [69].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties

Chen,

Zhang

2020

Preprint

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Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic hash of its initial code and data) to an enclave. To verify that the attested identity is trusted, one enclave usually includes the measurement of the enclave it trusts into its initial data in advance assuming no trusted third parties are available during runtime to provide this piece of information. However, when mutual trust between these two enclaves is required, it is infeasible to simultaneously include into their own initial data the other's measurements respectively as any change to the initial data will change their measurements, making the previously included measurements invalid. In this paper, we propose MAGE, a framework enabling a group of enclaves to mutually attest each other without trusted third parties. Particularly, we introduce a technique to instrument these enclaves so that each of them could derive the others' measurements using information solely from its own initial data. We also provide a prototype implementation based on Intel SGX SDK, to facilitate enclave developers to adopt this technique.

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Migrating SGX Enclaves with Persistent State

Cited by 26 publications

References 9 publications

CTR: Checkpoint, Transfer, and Restore for Secure Enclaves

CTR: Checkpoint, Transfer, and Restore for Secure Enclaves

Hybridchain: A Novel Architecture for Confidentiality-Preserving and Performant Permissioned Blockchain Using Trusted Execution Environment

MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties

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