Migration and pension with international capital mobility

Razin, Assaf; Sadka, Efraim

doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00038-9

Cited by 136 publications

(112 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…It seems difficult to generalize our results to unforced migrants regarding the average or aggregate effect. On the one hand, refugees differ in their lower impact on public finances compared with economic migrants, who could affect both social security and pension systems (Razin and Sadka, 1999). On the other hand, refugee inflows go along with a large spectrum of free-delivered services by NGOs and international organizations to the local population.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population

Maystadt

Verwimp

2014

Economic Development and Cultural Change

180

162

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The impact of a mass influx of refugees on the hosting economy is understudied and not well understood. Based on hypotheses formulated during two months of fieldwork and using a theoretical framework, we test the impact of the refugee presence on the welfare of the population of Kagera, Tanzania. Our identification strategy exploits both time and spatial variations in the way households traced between 1991 and 2004 have been affected by the refugee inflows originating from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994). While the aggregate effect is positive, local hosts, depending on their occupation, can be winners or losers.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population

Maystadt

Verwimp

2014

Economic Development and Cultural Change

180

162

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“…This argument has been used by many policy makers in Europe to highlight the potential role of immigration policy as a tool to deal with the difficulties created by pay as you go social security systems in the presence of an ageing population. For a formal analysis, see Razin and Sadka (1999), while Storesletten (2000) has studied how migration policy can be used to sustain the existing welfare system in the United States. See also Haupt and Peters (2003).…”

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confidence: 99%

Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Towards Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries

Facchini

Mayda

2007

SSRN Journal

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This paper analyzes welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants -within and across countries -and their interaction with labor-market drivers of preferences. We consider two different mechanisms through which a redistributive welfare system might adjust as a result of immigration. In the first model, immigration has a larger impact on individuals at the top of the income distribution, while under the second model it is low-income individuals who are most affected through this channel. Individual attitudes are consistent with the first welfare-state model and with labor-market determinants of immigration attitudes. In countries where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is positively correlated with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in economies characterized by skilled migration (relative to the native population). These results are confirmed when we exploit international differences in the characteristics of destination countries' welfare state.JEL classification: F22, F1, J61.

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“…The voting process leads to an outcome which is too low compared to the social optimum because the positive externality of immigration is not fully internalized. In a political economic framework, Razin and Sadka's (1999) positive view on immigration can therefore no longer be sustained. At the same time, Scholten and Thum's (1996) result becomes even more pronounced.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our model combines the basic ideas of two previous models. On the one hand, we take the more realistic defined-benefit system 2 from Scholten and Thum (1996) instead of the defined-contribution system in Razin and Sadka (1999). On the other hand, we distinguish voters by their skills as in Razin and Sadka (1999) and not only by their age as in Scholten and Thum (1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Pensions and Immigration Policy When Voters are Differently Skilled

Krieger

2004

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Although immigration of workers generates a positive externality on members of domestic pension systems, many countries are very reluctant to allow foreigners into their labor markets. In a political economic framework, we explain this voting outcome by considering a young unskilled median voter who faces -in addition to a reduction of contribution ratesnegative effects from immigration as well. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Migration and pension with international capital mobility

Cited by 136 publications

References 5 publications

Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population

Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population

Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Towards Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries

Public Pensions and Immigration Policy When Voters are Differently Skilled

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