Migration and the Welfare State

Abstract

A unified formal framework for studying how social benefits-immigration conflicts are resolved in a range of policy regimes. Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman once noted that free immigration cannot coexist with a welfare state. A welfare state with open borders might turn into a haven for poor immigrants, which would place such a fiscal burden on the state that native-born voters would support less-generous benefits or restricted immigration, or both. And yet a welfare state with an aging population might welcome young skilled immigrants. The preferences of the native-born population toward migration depend on the skill and age composition of the immigrants, and migration policies in a political-economy framework may be tailored accordingly. This book examines how social benefits-immigrations political economy conflicts are resolved, with an empirical application to data from Europe and the developed countries, integrating elements from population, international, public, and political economics into a unified static and dynamic framework. Using a static analytical framework to examine intra-generational distribution, the authors first focus on the skill composition of migrants in both free and restricted immigration policy regimes, drawing on empirical research from EU-15 and non-EU-15 states. The authors then offer theoretical analyses of similar issues in dynamic overlapping generations settings, studying not only intragenerational but also intergenerational aspects, including old-young dependency ratios and skilled-unskilled conflicts. Finally, they examine overall gains from or costs of migration in both host and source countries and the race to the bottom argument of tax competition between states in the presence of free migration.

Measuring Immigration Policies: Preliminary Evidence from IMPALA

“…Others emphasize ethnic tolerance or cosmopolitanism (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010;Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;Citrin et al 1997;McLaren 2001). Still others focus on cultural and ethnic differences or perceived threats to traditional culture and values, and a decline of "social capital" and trust, that can generate demands for more immigration restrictions (Putnam 2007;Huntington 2004;Dustmann and Preston 2007;Chandler and Tsai 2001;Burns and Gimpel 2000;Fetzer 2000, Harnoss 2014 or affect redistribution policies (see, e.g., Razin et al 2011, Burgoon, 2014, and Alesina et al, 2014 for recent contributions). And some researchers posit that historical experience with diversity and colonialism foster familiarity with difference and make immigration more acceptable politically (Freeman 1979;Olzak 1992;Cornelius et al 2004).…”

Immigration to the U.S.: A Problem for the Republicans or the Democrats?

“…Alternatively, a quota equilibrium could prevail in which the group in the majority -either skilled or unskilled -admits immigrants of the opposite type but limits their number through quotas, in order to retain future political power. Finally, Razin et al (2011) focus on the joint decision of voters on immigration and redistribution policies, respectively. They emphasize how, in terms of immigration and redistribution, a democratic state would produce policies that are consistent with each other so that, when immigration is more open, natives restrict redistribution for fear of net transfers to immigrants, while when immigration is more restricted, they are willing to allow more redistribution.…”

Cross-border Migration in the Context of Competitiveness of Host Countries

“…: "Германия, магнит благосостояния", "Директива о свободном передвижении: бесплатный билет в государство всеобщего благосостояния", "Миграционный шторм", "Варвары или гении у ворот?". Эксперты указывали на опасность для экономики страны "социальной миграции" [Razin, 2013].…”

“…Политика привлечения "мозгов" уже много десятилетий проводится властями США. В то время как Европа за два последних десятилетия приняла 85% всех неквалифицированных мигрантов, переселившихся в развитые страны, США сохраняют привлечение образованных мигрантов со всего мира на уровне свыше 55% [Razin, 2013]. Стремление президента Д. Трампа ограничить нелегальную миграцию, по сути, имеет целью обеспечить её "правильную" структуру в интересах укрепления конкурентоспособности страны.…”